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Puzzles of the Zero-Rate Royalty 
Eli Greenbaum* 
Patentees increasingly exploit their intellectual property rights 
through royalty-free licensing arrangements. Even though patentees us-
ing such frameworks forfeit their right to trade patents for monetary 
gain, royalty-free arrangements can be used to pursue other significant 
commercial and collaborative interests. This Article argues that modern 
royalty-free structures generate tension between various otherwise well-
accepted doctrines of patent remedies law that were designed for more 
traditional licensing models. As such, current doctrines provide conflict-
ing frameworks for evaluating the royalty-free arrangement, and offer 
inconsistent approaches for determining the appropriate remedy for their 
breach. This discord grows out of courts’ inadequate attention to non-
monetary consideration in licensing transactions, and how such non-
monetary obligations have been used to structure the licensing relation-
ship and broader collaborative efforts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.1 was one of the most influen-
tial patent decisions of the last generation.2 The Supreme Court in 
eBay held that courts must apply a four-factor “equitable test” 
when deciding whether to grant permanent injunctions against pa-
tent infringement, overturning the prior rule which had been more 
undiscriminating in making available injunctive relief.3 The deci-
sion reverberated far past the initial patent context, transforming 
the jurisprudence of remedies throughout American law.4 During 
oral arguments, counsel for eBay argued successfully against the 
prior rule, asserting that the profligate availability of injunctions 
“distorts tremendously”5 settlement discussions and licensing ne-
gotiations.6 Justice Scalia challenged eBay’s attorney: Is “the free 
                                                                                                                            
1 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
2 See Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the Public 
Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 8 (2012) (noting that eBay “represented a sea change in 
patent litigation”); Eric R. Claeys, The Conceptual Relation Between IP Rights and 
Infringement Remedies, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 825, 825 (2015) (observing that eBay 
“sparked a major reconsideration” of remedies for the infringement of intellectual 
property); Mark P. Gergen et al., The Supreme Court’s Accidental Revolution? The Test for 
Permanent Injunctions, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 203, 205 (2012) (asserting that eBay “has had 
[a] cataclysmic effect” and that the opinion “swept aside long-settled presumptions about 
when injunctive relief should issue”). 
3 Claeys, supra note 2. 
4 Gergen et al., supra note 2, at 214–19 (describing how courts now apply eBay to 
determine whether injunctions should issue in “virtually all types of cases,” including 
constitutional, regulatory, and contractual disputes). 
5 Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 
(2006) (No. 05-130). 
6 Legal scholars had already noted the effect of injunctions on licensing and settlement 
negotiations. Potential licensees often found themselves bargaining under the looming 
possibility of court-ordered injunctions, increasing the likelihood that they would agree to 
onerous or unfair licensing terms. See, e.g., Chien & Lemley, supra note 2, at 8 (asserting 
that prior to eBay “even a very weak patent could command a high royalty in settlement 
from defendants afraid of gambling their entire product on a jury’s decision”); Mark A. 
Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2008 
(2007) (showing how the threat of an injunction can “enable a patent holder to negotiate 
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market [not] normally adequate” to address concerns about license 
negotiations, he asked?7 Patentees, he asserted, would grant li-
censes where it made “financial sense.”8 After all, Justice Scalia 
continued, “[e]verybody is in this for the money.”9 
It turns out, in fact, that many patentees are not in it for the 
money. Patent holders have increasingly turned to royalty-free (or 
zero-rate royalty) licensing strategies for proprietary technology. 
Under this licensing model, patentees provide broad access to their 
technology at no monetary charge, but expect to either gain from 
non-financial licensing obligations or profit from the sale of com-
plementary goods or technology.10 Royalty-free patent licensing 
commitments can arise in a range of contexts, from assurances that 
patentees make to standard-setting organizations to unilateral pa-
tent pledges made independent of any collaborative process.11 Ze-
ro-rate patent licenses are also frequently embedded in popular 
open source software and hardware licenses.12 Contrary to the as-
sertion of Justice Scalia, in none of these licensing strategies does 
the patentee provide access to patented technology in exchange for 
money consideration. 
Zero-rate commitments only fit awkwardly into eBay’s new 
world of patent remedies. As part of its four-factor test, eBay re-
quired all patentees seeking injunctive relief to show that continued 
infringement would cause “irreparable injury.”13 This standard 
                                                                                                                            
a settlement . . . significantly exceeding the amount that the patent holder could expect to 
earn in damages based on reasonable royalties”). 
7 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 5, at 11. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 See infra text accompanying notes 88–93. 
11 See discussion infra Part I. 
12 Id. Free and open source software licenses, of course, often provide users with both 
copyright and patent licenses. Except for a brief digression in Part IV, this Article focuses 
only on the patent rights included in open source licenses. For analysis of the impact eBay 
has had in the copyright context, see Jiarui Liu, Copyright Injunctions After eBay: An 
Empirical Study, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 215 (2012). 
13 See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). eBay, of course, 
required a showing of three factors in addition to “irreparable injury.” Id. This Article 
generally uses the term “irreparable injury” as shorthand both for that factor and for the 
second eBay factor—that plaintiff has an “inadequate” remedy at law. Courts and 
commentators have recognized that the two factors only use different words to express 
the same concept: that the grant of money damages will not provide sufficient 
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made it more difficult for patentees with a business model of licens-
ing their technology for cash to obtain injunctive relief. Such paten-
tees, because they widely license their technology rather than use 
patents to exclude competitors, cannot easily show that unautho-
rized use of the technology causes irreparable injury, or that the 
monetary compensation which they ordinarily seek from licensees 
provides an insufficient remedy.14 Patentees that provide royalty-
free licensing commitments, however, do so only in exchange for 
non-financial consideration, though they also broadly license their 
technology. Do money damages, which courts have seen as provid-
ing adequate compensation for licensors that seek cash, also pro-
vide a sufficient remedy for a patentee that has explicitly re-
nounced the pursuit of monetary gain? Would the eBay test corres-
pondingly limit the ability of such patentees to obtain injunctions 
against infringement? 
This Article argues that the increasingly popular royalty-free 
commitment produces sharp discord between two well-accepted 
strands of patent remedy law concerning injunctive relief, and pro-
vides no easy means of reconciling that conflict. On the one hand, 
the royalty-free commitment implicates a succession of cases main-
taining that courts will not grant injunctions to patentees which 
indiscriminately license their patented technology.15 These doc-
trines have been applied in cases where “patent trolls” rear their 
heads, and have also recently culminated in case law limiting the 
availability of injunctive relief for patentees that have made fair, 
                                                                                                                            
compensation to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Gergen et al., supra note 2, at 209 (asserting that 
eBay’s “requirements of (1) irreparable injury and (2) inadequacy of legal remedies are 
redundant as these are, traditionally speaking, one and the same”); see also ActiveVideo 
Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 694 F.3d 1312, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
(“[I]ssues of irreparable harm and the adequacy of remedies at law are inextricably 
intertwined.”); MercExchange L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 569 n.11 (E.D. 
Va. 2007) (“The irreparable harm inquiry and remedy at law inquiry are essentially two 
sides of the same coin.”). The other two eBay factors—balance of the hardships and the 
public interest—have generally not been relevant to judicial analysis of the effect of a 
patentee’s licensing activity on the issuance of an injunction and, as such, will not be 
considered by this Article. 
14 See discussion infra Section II.B (discussing the effect of eBay on the issuance of 
injunctions to “patent trolls”) and Section II.C (discussing the effect of eBay on the 
issuance of injunctions for fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory encumbered patents). 
15 See infra Section III.A. 
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reasonable, and non-discriminatory (“FRAND”)16 commitments, 
under which firms pledge to license their patented technology un-
der “fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory” terms.17 On the oth-
er hand, conflicting jurisprudence points to the importance of 
courts providing injunctive relief in situations where infringement 
damages are challenging to calculate in monetary terms. According 
to these precedents, if a court cannot accurately quantify damages 
from infringement, it should provide injunctive relief and let the 
parties come to a price themselves.18 These two lines of cases come 
into sharp conflict in the royalty-free licensing commitment, where 
patentees grant broad access to their technology, but at the same 
time expressly refuse financial reward and provide such access only 
in exchange for non-monetary obligations the value of which may 
be extraordinarily difficult to measure. 
This conflict reflects a more extensive jurisprudential disregard 
of the varied uses of patent rights in the modern economy. eBay 
and its progeny echo the classic dichotomy: Patents can be used to 
fence off certain technologies from competitors, or they can be li-
censed for monetary reward. Lost in this analysis, however, is how 
patents can be—and increasingly are—employed toward more in-
tangible goals. Patentees wield patent rights not only to exclude or 
seek financial gain, but also in pursuing freedom of use, in nudging 
                                                                                                                            
16 For a more detailed discussion of FRAND commitments, see infra Section II.C. 
This Article generally uses the FRAND (rather than reasonable and non-discriminatory, 
or RAND) terminology, as does the leading case, Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 
1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014), which is also discussed in more detail in Section II.C. Scholars 
have not noted any meaningful distinction between the FRAND or RAND nomenclature. 
17 Some well-accepted acronyms for the royalty-free licensing commitment highlight 
the similarity to FRAND pledges. Royalty-free commitments, for example, are often 
referred to as RAND-Z (meaning RAND licenses at a zero-rate royalty) or RAND-RF 
(meaning RAND licensing under royalty-free terms). Both of these labels highlight the 
promise to provide licenses without compensation, but also denote that such licensing 
commitments do not preclude the inclusion of additional “reasonable and non-
discriminatory” non-monetary terms. See, e.g, Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. 
Co., 753 F.3d 395, 401 (2d Cir. 2014) (analyzing “RAND-Zero” terms in a licensing 
commitment). 
18 See discussion infra Section III.B; see also Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, 
and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2655, 2664 (1994) (arguing that “[c]ourts are 
simply not well-situated to make difficult valuations” in the field of intellectual property 
infringement and that, as a result, “property rules” enforced by injunctions may be more 
appropriate). 
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markets toward certain technologies, and in structuring frame-
works for collaborative communities.19 Courts, unfortunately, have 
been hesitant in grappling with this complexity. The doctrinal con-
tradictions of the royalty-free commitment stem from this deeper 
failure to develop a patent remedy jurisprudence that addresses 
these non-monetary ambitions. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I provides a broad over-
view of royalty-free licensing commitments, demonstrating how 
such commitments arise in a broad range of contexts from stan-
dard-setting organizations to open source licenses. While zero-rate 
commitments do not demand the payment of money royalties, they 
do impose a range of non-financial obligations. Part I also analyzes 
some of these latter obligations, and shows how such non-monetary 
devices further the commercial and collaborative goals of paten-
tees. Part II surveys prior case law considering the impact of li-
censes and licensing commitments on the availability of injunctive 
relief for patent infringement—from patent trolls to FRAND li-
censing obligations. Part III applies this prior jurisprudence in the 
context of royalty-free licensing commitments, demonstrating how 
that context produces sharp tension between doctrines of patent 
remedy law which may be well accepted in other contexts. Part IV 
examines how non-monetary commitments have been considered 
in other patent infringement settings, demonstrating how the doc-
trinal conflicts which surface in the royalty-free commitment have 
deep roots in patent remedy jurisprudence. The Conclusion puts 
forward some modest prescriptive suggestions. 
                                                                                                                            
19 See discussion infra Section I.E (describing how royalty-free commitments are used 
to promote interoperable technologies and how non-monetary obligations are employed 
to cement collaborative relationships) and Part IV (explaining how cross-licensing 
strategies are aimed toward achieving freedom to operate); see also Nicos L. Tsilas, Open 
Innovation and Interoperability, in OPENING STANDARDS: THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF 
INTEROPERABILITY 97, 97 (Laura DeNardis ed., 2011) (arguing that “IP’s legal power to 
exclude is increasingly being replaced by its real-world ability to serve as a bridge to 
collaboration”). 
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I. ROYALTY-FREE LICENSES AND COMMITMENTS 
Royalty-free licenses and royalty-free commitments find in-
creasingly widespread use.20 This Part reviews the terms of several 
prominent zero-rate commitments in a range of contexts, from 
royalty-free assurances that are provided in the setting of a colla-
borative development process to pledges that are provided unilate-
rally by the patentee. Zero-rate commitments are also used in 
common licensing structures, such as free and open source licenses 
and defensive licensing arrangements. In short, royalty-free ar-
rangements are pervasive in the modern high-technology industry. 
This review of royalty-free arrangements draws out several 
broader themes. First, this Article focuses on commitments that 
are “non-discriminatory.” Scholars have debated the meaning of 
commitments to provide licenses on a “non-discriminatory” basis, 
but most fundamentally the term means that the licensor will not 
deny a license to any party, regardless of such party’s identity or 
competitive position.21 In other words, by providing a commitment 
that is both royalty-free and non-discriminatory, a patentee waives 
two significant legal rights. First, in making the royalty-free com-
mitment, a patentee waives its right to seek compensation for the 
use of its intellectual property. Second, in making the non-
discriminatory commitment, a patentee waives its right to refuse to 
license the committed patent, notwithstanding the patent holder’s 
ordinary legal prerogative to choose its business partners.22 The 
                                                                                                                            
20 A license is distinct from a licensing commitment in that the latter only constitutes a 
pledge to provide a license but does not actually provide the requisite rights to access or 
use the technology. The distinction can be important where, as in the FRAND context, a 
licensing commitment leaves significant aspects of the license for future negotiation. See, 
e.g., Richard Gilbert, Deal or No Deal? Licensing Negotiations in Standard-Setting 
Organizations, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 855, 859 (2011) (discussing a range of possibilities for 
structuring FRAND royalty rates). The distinction may also be important in specific legal 
contexts such as contract or bankruptcy law. See generally Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, 
FRAND’s Forever: Standards, Patent Transfers, and Licensing Commitments, 89 IND. L.J. 
231 (2014). For the sake of brevity, the terminology of this Article does not always 
explicitly distinguish between royalty-free licenses and royalty-free licensing 
commitments (except where necessary). 
21 See generally Eli Greenbaum, The Non-Discrimination Principle in Open Source 
Licensing, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1297 (2016). 
22 Under general principles of patent law, a patentee is ordinarily free to refuse to 
license its invention. See, e.g., Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 432 
(1945) (“A patent owner is not . . . under any obligation to see that the public acquires the 
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surrender of these two rights is closely connected. Most discus-
sions concerning “non-discrimination” in licensing commitments 
focus on whether and to what extent a committed patentee may 
collect different royalty rates from differently situated licensees.23 
The royalty-free assurance, however, obviates this debate by set-
ting the royalties for all licensees at zero. As such, by removing the 
ability to price-discriminate, the zero-rate assurance also reinforces 
the “non-discrimination” prong of the licensing commitment. Lat-
er sections of this Article will discuss the import of the non-
discriminatory features of these commitments to the remedies 
available for their breach.24 
Second, this Part shows that zero-rate commitments, though 
they do not require the payment of cash consideration, do typically 
impose significant non-monetary requirements and limitations. 
Section I.E also demonstrates the importance of such non-
monetary requirements to the patentee, and how such devices are 
often structured to further the ultimate ambitions motivating the 
royalty-free license.25 An understanding of the rationales underly-
ing such non-monetary requirements can be essential for determin-
ing the appropriate legal remedies for their breach. Later sections 
of this Article will apply these discussions to examine whether eBay 
provides a coherent framework for analyzing the infringement of 
patents that are subject to royalty-free patent licensing commit-
ments.26 
                                                                                                                            
free right to use the invention. He has no obligation either to use it or to grant its use to 
others.”); In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d. 1322, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2000) 
(Defendant “was under no obligation to sell or license its patented parts and did not 
violate the antitrust laws by refusing to do so.”); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 
1195, 1204 (2d Cir. 1981) (The refusal by a patent holder to license is “expressly 
permitted by the patent laws.”); see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4) (2012) (providing that 
refusal to license patents does not constitute patent misuse). 
23 See Dennis W. Carlton & Allan L. Shampine, An Economic Interpretation of FRAND, 
9 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 531 (2013) (summarizing literature on the non-discrimination 
prong of FRAND commitments); Gilbert, supra note 20, at 859–60 (discussing how non-
discrimination commitments allow for a range of royalties and royalty structures). 
24 See infra Part III. 
25 See infra Section I.E. 
26 See infra Part III. 
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A. Standards Organizations 
Royalty-free arrangements are a common feature of the com-
mitments that participants provide to collaborative standards or-
ganizations, especially those organizations that develop technical 
standards for the Internet.27 The World Wide Web Consortium 
(“W3C”), for instance, is a prominent example of a standards or-
ganization that requires participants to make non-discriminatory 
royalty-free commitments.28 W3C is a central organization devel-
oping standards for the World Wide Web, and currently boasts ap-
proximately 400 members internationally.29 All participants in the 
creation of W3C standards agree to the “W3C Patent Policy,” 
which was formally adopted by the organization in February 
2004.30 According to the policy, W3C participants agree to provide 
royalty-free licenses for any patents that cover an agreed technical 
standard on a non-discriminatory basis—to “all, worldwide, 
whether or not they are W3C Members.”31 At the same time, the 
policy allows participants to impose some non-monetary condi-
tions: Participants may narrow the scope of the license to the spe-
cific requirements of the implementation of the standard.32 In addi-
                                                                                                                            
27 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 
AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 47 
(2007) (“The evolution of the Internet may present the best opportunity to study market 
experiments in royalty-free licensing.”). 
28 For a history of the royalty-free licensing architecture of the W3C, see Andrew L. 
Russell, Constructing Legitimacy: The W3C’s Patent Policy, in OPENING STANDARDS: THE 
GLOBAL POLITICS OF INTEROPERABILITY, supra note 19, at 159, 167. 
29 About W3C, W3C, http://www.w3.org/Consortium/ [https://perma.cc/L5WM-
WQM7] (last visited Oct. 11, 2016); Current Members, W3C, https://www.w3.org/ 
Consortium/Member/List/ [https://perma.cc/JT6Q-PPPX] (last visited Oct. 11, 2016). 
30 W3C Patent Policy, W3C, http://www.w3.org/Consortium/Patent-Policy-
20040205/ [https://perma.cc/Q96G-YC9L] (last visited Oct. 11, 2016). 
31 Id. §§ 3.1, 5. 
32 Id. § 5 (stating that royalty-free licenses may be limited to “implementations of the 
Recommendation, and to what is required by the Recommendation”); id. § 8 (detailing 
the definition of the “Essential Claims” which must be licensed royalty-free). Certain 
supporters of free and open source software have objected to the possibility of limiting 
W3C licenses to the agreed specifications of the standard. According to these advocates, 
such limitations would be inconsistent with the freedom to modify licensed software 
generally provided by free and open source software licenses. See Free Software Found., 
FSF’s Position on W3 Consortium “Royalty-Free” Patent Policy, GNU OPERATING SYS. 
(June 1, 2003), http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/w3c-patent.en.html [https://perma.cc/ 
ACT5-GKUW]. 
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tion, participants may also condition any license on the grant of a 
reciprocal royalty-free license.33 The W3C will generally not ap-
prove a standard if the patentee does not make the technology 
available under the required royalty-free terms.34 
Some standards organizations allow, but do not require, partic-
ipants to provide non-discriminatory royalty-free commitments. 
The Internet Engineering Task Force (“IETF”), for example, is a 
standards body responsible for developing standards for the Inter-
net, including the widely used communication protocol TCP/IP.35 
The IETF requires participants to disclose whether they own pa-
tents covering their contributions to any proposed standard, and 
recommends that disclosures specify whether such rights are avail-
able on a non-discriminatory basis under either royalty-free terms 
or other reasonable terms.36 The IETF takes such disclosed licens-
ing information into account when deciding on the specifications of 
a standard, and explicitly prefers technology that is either not cov-
ered by patents or is available under royalty-free terms.37 In prac-
tice, a large number of contributors to IETF standards make their 
patent rights available on a royalty-free basis.38 As with other stan-
                                                                                                                            
33 W3C Patent Policy, supra note 30, § 5.4 (stating that royalty-free licenses may be 
“conditioned on the grant of a reciprocal RF [royalty-free] license”). 
34 Id. § 2. Section 7.5.3 of the W3C Patent Policy sets out an involved procedure for 
approving, in exceptional situations, license terms that are not royalty-free. See id. § 7.5.3. 
35 The IETF has been described as “the single most important Internet standards 
body.” Lawrence Lessig, The Limits in Open Code: Regulatory Standards and the Future of 
the Net, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 759, 760 n.2 (1999). For a description of the history, 
structure, and function of the IETF, see Scott Bradner, The Internet Engineering Task 
Force, in OPEN SOURCES: VOICES FROM THE OPEN SOURCE REVOLUTION 47 (Chris Debona 
et al. eds., 1999). 
36 See S. Bradner, Intellectual Property Rights in IETF Technology, INTERNET 
ENGINEERING TASK FORCE § 6 (Mar. 2005), https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3979.txt 
[https://perma.cc/J938-ZYH2] (requiring disclosure of intellectual property rights 
covering contributions); id. § 6.5 (specifying the licensing information to be included in a 
disclosure, such as whether “all persons will be able to obtain” the applicable rights 
under “non-discriminatory” royalty-free terms or under terms that are “non-
discriminatory” but require a “reasonable royalty or other payment”). 
37 Id. § 8. 
38 Jorge L. Contreras, Technical Standards and Ex Ante Disclosure: Results and Analysis 
of an Empirical Study, 53 JURIMETRICS J. 163, 182–83 (2013) (finding that more than half of 
all licensing disclosures to the IETF contained royalty-free or patent non-assertion 
commitments). The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standards 
Association (“IEEE-SA”) is another prominent standards organization that allows 
participants to choose either a RAND or royalty-free licensing policy. See Letter of 
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dards organizations, the IETF allows participants to impose certain 
minimal non-monetary conditions.39 Empirical studies have found 
that a majority of IETF commitments include non-monetary condi-
tions, such as demands that any license include defensive suspen-
sion provisions40 or that licensees provide reciprocal patent li-
censes.41 
A number of standard-setting organizations outside the Inter-
net context also require that participants make royalty-free com-
mitments. These include the USB Implementers Forum (“USB-
IF”), which develops specifications for the Universal Serial Bus 
(“USB”) standards, and the Bluetooth Special Interest Group 
(“Bluetooth SIG”), which designs the Bluetooth standard for wire-
less data transmission.42 In contrast to the W3C and IEFT, which 
announced general patent policies but left individual members to 
hammer out the particular terms of any bilateral license agreement, 
both the USB-IF and Bluetooth SIG set out more specific license 
terms.43 The USB-IF, for example, requires adopters to agree to 
the detailed provisions of the USB 3.0 Adopters Agreement, which 
details the royalty-free license terms that such adopters agree to 
                                                                                                                            
Assurance for Essential Patent Claims, IEEE STANDARDS ASS’N (Dec. 2015), 
https://development.standards.ieee.org/myproject/Public//mytools/mob/loa.pdf [https: 
//perma.cc/U545-PDRK]. In contrast to the IETF, however, most licensing disclosures 
to the IEEE-SA do not provide for royalty-free licensing commitments. See Contreras, 
supra, at 183 n.88. 
39 Bradner, supra note 36, § 6.5(a) (specifying that contributors may state that they will 
make technology available under “royalty-free and otherwise reasonable and non-
discriminatory” terms). 
40 See, e.g., Contreras, supra note 38, at 182.  A defensive suspension provision 
(sometimes referred to as a defensive termination provision) allows the licensor to 
terminate the license, typically in circumstances where the licensee brings a patent 
infringement suit against the licensor. As the discussion below will show, the scope of 
such defensive provisions can vary. 
41 Contreras, supra note 38, at 182. 
42 See About USB Implementers Forum, Inc., UNIVERSAL SERIAL BUS, 
http://www.usb.org/about [https://perma.cc/7LR2-SJ6K] (last visited Oct. 11, 2016); 
Bluetooth Core Specification, BLUETOOTH, https://www.bluetooth.com/specifications/ 
bluetooth-core-specification [https://perma.cc/KN7M-JAJF] (last visited Nov. 4, 2016). 
43 Bluetooth Patent/Copyright License Agreement, BLUETOOTH § 5, https://www. 
bluetooth.org/DocMan/handlers/DownloadDoc.ashx?doc_id=67s [https://perma.cc/ 
7EGC-SY4U] (last visited Oct. 11, 2016) [hereinafter Bluetooth License Agreement]; USB 
3.0 Adopters Agreement, UNIVERSAL SERIAL BUS § 2.1(b), http://www.usb.org/ 
developers/docs/USB_3_0_Adopters_Agreement_Final_020411.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/W65U-TTLY] (last visited Oct. 11, 2016). 
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provide all other implementers of the technology.44 The Bluetooth 
Patent/Copyright License Agreement provides for a similar royal-
ty-free license for implementations of the Bluetooth specification.45 
Notwithstanding these royalty-free licenses, both agreements in-
clude important non-monetary terms. For example, both agree-
ments narrowly define the scope of the royalty-free commitment, 
limiting any license to the specific patent claims that are necessary 
for interoperability with the agreed specifications46 and both 
agreements in effect condition their royalty-free licenses on the re-
ciprocal grant of a license at the same zero rate.47 
B. Commitments Outside of Standards 
Some royalty-free patent commitments are made independent 
of any standards development process. For example, both IBM48 
and Google49 have made unilateral commitments not to assert spe-
cific listed patents against any open source software, effectively 
granting all users and developers of open source software a royalty-
                                                                                                                            
44 USB Adopters 3.0 Agreement, supra note 43. The USB 3.0 Contributors Agreement, 
signed by all contributors to the USB 3.0 specifications, contained a similar license 
provision. See Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395, 401 (2d Cir. 
2014). 
45 Bluetooth License Agreement, supra note 43, § 5. 
46 Section 2.1 of the USB 3.0 Adopters Agreement, together with related definitions in 
Sections 1.5, 1.7, and 1.9 of the agreement, limits the scope of the granted patent license. 
See USB Adopters 3.0 Agreement, supra note 43, §§ 1.5, 1.7., 1.9, 2.1. The Bluetooth 
License Agreement contains analogous provisions. See Bluetooth License Agreement, supra 
note 43, § 1(j), 1(o), 1(p). 
47 See Bluetooth License Agreement, supra note 43, § 5(b) (providing that the royalty-free 
license may be changed to a royalty-bearing license if the licensor is sued for patent 
infringement for the manufacture, use, or sale of Bluetooth-compatible products); USB 
3.0 Adopters Agreement, supra note 43, § 2.1(a)–(b) (providing that license grants “may be 
conditioned upon Licensee’s grant of a reciprocal license”). 
48 See IBM Statement of Non-Assertion of Named Patents Against OSS, IBM, 
http://www.ibm.com/ibm/licensing/patents/pledgedpatents.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
JPZ5-28B7] (last visited Oct. 11, 2016) [hereinafter IBM OSS Pledge]. The IBM OSS 
Pledge is provided indiscriminately to “any open source software developer, distributor, 
or user.”  Id. 
49 See Open Patent Non-Assertion Pledge, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/patents/ 
opnpledge/pledge/ [https://perma.cc/S3WC-L4WS] (last visited Oct. 11, 2016) 
[hereinafter Google Open Patent Pledge]. The Google Open Patent Pledge is 
indiscriminately provided to “each person or entity that develops, distributes or uses 
Free or Open Source Software.” Id. 
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free license to those particular patents.50 As with commitments 
made to standards organizations, these unilateral pledges are sub-
ject to specific non-monetary conditions. First, most obviously, the 
scope of the pledges is strictly limited to open source software.51 
Second, both pledges contain reciprocal or defensive licensing pro-
visions. The Google Open Patent Pledge, for instance, states that 
the pledge can be terminated against any entity that files any kind 
of patent infringement lawsuit against Google, any of Google’s af-
filiates, or against any of Google’s products or services.52 The IBM 
pledge provides that the pledge can be terminated against any enti-
ty that files a lawsuit against any open source software.53 In other 
words, any entity that wants to rely on the Google or IBM pledges 
may find itself substantially constrained in how it can assert its own 
intellectual property rights. 
In June 2014, Tesla Motors publicized a unilateral patent 
commitment which garnered a great deal of media attention. Tesla 
announced on its Internet blog that the firm would “not initiate 
patent lawsuits against anyone who, in good faith, wants to use our 
technology.”54 The informal pledge was soon followed up with 
more formal legal terms, which detailed the scope and conditions 
                                                                                                                            
50 Federal courts have held that a covenant not to assert patent rights is equivalent to a 
patent license. See, e.g., TransCore, LP v. Elec. Transaction Consultants Corp., 563 F.3d 
1271, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“The real question, then, is not whether an agreement is 
framed in terms of a ‘covenant not to sue’ or a ‘license.’ That difference is only one of 
form, not substance—both are properly viewed as ‘authorizations.’”). 
51 Both the Google and IBM pledges contain detailed definitions of “open source 
software.” See Google Open Patent Pledge, supra note 49; IBM OSS Pledge, supra note 48. 
The Google pledge further narrows the scope of the commitment by clarifying that the 
pledge does not apply to open source software “combined with special purpose hardware 
or with software that is not Free or Open Source Software.” Google Open Patent Pledge, 
supra note 49. 
52 Google Open Patent Pledge, supra note 49 (stating that it is “only fair that we condition 
the Pledge upon the Pledge Recipient (and its affiliates) not asserting or profiting from the 
assertion of patents against Google, its affiliates, or its products or services”). 
53 IBM OSS Pledge, supra note 48 (stating that IBM “reserves the right to terminate 
this patent pledge and commitment only with regard to any party who files a lawsuit 
asserting patents or other intellectual property rights against Open Source Software”). 
54 Elon Musk, All Our Patents Are Belong to You, TESLA BLOG (June 12, 2014), 
http://www.teslamotors.com/blog/all-our-patent-are-belong-you [https://perma.cc/ 
CFG6-MAPC]. 
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of the commitment.55 The formal legal terms amplified Tesla’s in-
formal “good faith” requirement into a rather expansive defensive 
condition, clarifying that the patent pledge would not be extended 
to firms that bring any patent claims against Tesla or any other 
firm’s electric vehicle technology, or that imitated or copied the 
“design or appearance of a Tesla product or which suggests an as-
sociation or endorsement by Tesla.”56 
The Eco-Patent Commons comprises a number of firms that 
have organized to provide indiscriminate royalty-free patent rights 
unconnected to any standards development process. The Eco-
Patent Commons “manages a collection of patents pledged for un-
encumbered use . . . to improve and protect the global environ-
ment.”57 Under the terms of the Commons’ Non-Assert Pledge, all 
members provide a commitment not to assert certain pledged pa-
tents when used for environmental applications.58 As usual, the 
commitment is subject to the regular non-monetary devices. First, 
the commitment is of narrow scope in that it is limited to specific 
environmental fields.59 Second, the Eco-Patent Pledge is subject to 
broad defensive termination conditions.60 
                                                                                                                            
55 Patent Pledge, TESLA (June 12, 2014), https://www.teslamotors.com/about/legal# 
patent-pledge [https://perma.cc/3FKP-W2XY]. 
56 Id. Six months later, Toyota made a similar public announcement that it would make 
available “thousands of hydrogen fuel cell patents royalty free.” See Toyota Opens the 
Door and Invites the Industry to the Hydrogen Future, TOYOTA USA NEWSROOM (Jan. 5, 
2015), http://www.toyotanewsroom.com/releases/toyota+fuel+cell+patents+ces+ 
2015.htm [https://perma.cc/8QHC-M28D]. The press release stated that Toyota would 
“request, but will not require, that other companies share their fuel cell-related patents 
with Toyota for similar royalty-free use.” Id. At the same time, Toyota made clear that 
any royalty-free license would be subject to the negotiated provisions of a license 
agreement that could include “additional details, including licensing terms.” Id. 
57 See About the Eco-Patent Commons, ECO-PATENT COMMONS,  https:// 
ecopatentcommons.org/about-eco-patent-commons [https://perma.cc/YKG5-YT7X] 
(last visited Oct. 11, 2016). 
58 Non-Assert Pledge, ECO-PATENT COMMONS, https://ecopatentcommons.org/sites/ 
default/files/docs/ecopatentgroundrules.pdf [https://perma.cc/LG94-K6UQ] (last 
visited Oct. 11, 2016) [hereinafter Eco-Patent Pledge]. The Eco-Patent Pledge is quite 
explicit in its non-discriminatory nature, stating that “[t]his pledge is available to 
everyone directly from us.” Id. 
59 The Eco-Patent Pledge is limited to a product or service that “reduces/eliminates 
natural resource consumption, reduces/eliminates waste generation or pollution, or 
otherwise provides environmental benefit(s).” Id. 
60 See id. The Eco-Patent Pledge also contains an additional, narrower defensive 
provision applicable to members of the Commons. Id. 
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C. Free and Open Source Licenses 
Open source licenses often provide for royalty-free patent 
rights. Open source licenses can be used by individual firms releas-
ing their own software code, as well as by collaborative projects 
that use open source licenses to help coordinate the legal terms of 
cooperation.61 In other words, open source licenses provide tem-
plate terms for the licensing of intellectual property in a variety of 
unrelated circumstances. All free and open source licenses, howev-
er, are by definition non-discriminatory: A patentee that provides 
materials under an open source license provides the same patent 
rights to all users of the licensed materials, and forgoes the right to 
select its future licensees.62 
A number of popular free and open source licenses contain ex-
press royalty-free patent licenses. The Apache 2.0 open source li-
cense, for example, is used by a range of prominent open source 
software projects, including the Android mobile operating system 
(unilaterally developed by Google) and the OpenStack project (a 
collaborative development of cloud computing software).63 The 
Apache license provides all users of these projects with a clear 
royalty-free patent license, stating that users receive from contribu-
tors a “no-charge, royalty-free” license for certain patent claims 
                                                                                                                            
61 See, e.g., STEVEN WEBER, THE SUCCESS OF OPEN SOURCE 179 (2004) (describing 
open source licenses as a “de facto constitution” for an open source collaboration, which, 
“[i]n the absence of hierarchical authority, . . . becomes the core statement of the social 
structure” of an open source community). 
62 See Free Software Found., What is Free Software?, GNU OPERATING SYS., 
https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.html [https://perma.cc/RV4Z-CAL7] (last 
visited Oct. 11, 2016) (noting that “free” software must be free for redistribution to 
“anyone anywhere,” “for any purpose,” “on any kind of computer system”); The Open 
Source Definition (Annotated), OPEN SOURCE INITIATIVE §§ 5–6,  http://opensource.org/ 
osd-annotated [https://perma.cc/KK4G-9K9A] (last visited Oct. 11, 2016) (stating that 
open source software cannot discriminate against specific “person or groups of persons” 
or “fields of endeavor”). See generally Greenbaum, supra note 21. 
63 For the text of the Apache 2.0 License, see Apache License, APACHE SOFTWARE 
FOUND. (Jan. 2004), http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 [https://perma.cc/ 
ND7Q-V47M]. For background on Google’s development and distribution of Android, 
see STEVEN LEVY, IN THE PLEX: HOW GOOGLE THINKS, WORKS, AND SHAPES OUR LIVES 
214–15 (2011). For information on the OpenStack project and its diverse collection of 
contributors, see OPENSTACK, https://www.openstack.org [https://perma.cc/PV4N-
HWHC] (last visited Oct. 11, 2016). 
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covering that software.64 Similarly, the popular General Public Li-
cense (“GPL”) is used by projects as varied as Linux (a collabora-
tively developed operating system) and MySQL (database software 
owned and unilaterally developed by Oracle).65 The latest version 
of the GPL provides users with a royalty-free patent license of 
scope comparable to the patent terms of the Apache license.66 
The absence of royalty payment obligations in free and open 
source licenses does not mean that these licenses come with no 
strings attached. In fact, both the Apache and GPL patent licenses 
impose significant non-monetary conditions. Both licenses express-
ly limit the scope of the granted patent rights.67 In addition, both 
                                                                                                                            
64 Apache License, supra note 63, § 3. 
65 See Frequently Asked Questions, LINUX KERNEL ARCHIVES (May 12, 2016),  
https://www.kernel.org/category/faq.html [https://perma.cc/3ZGZ-VHSF] (noting 
how the Linux kernel is released under GNU GPL version 2); MySQL Community 
Edition, MYSQL, https://www.mysql.com/products/community/ [https://perma.cc/ 
8K7C-5ENE] (last visited Oct. 11, 2016) (making available the MySQL Community 
Edition under the terms of the GPL). 
66 The most current version of the GPL is available at Free Software Found., GNU 
General Public License, GNU OPERATING SYS. (June 29, 2007), http://www.gnu.org/ 
licenses/gpl-3.0.en.html [https://perma.cc/986J-WEUX] [hereinafter GPLv3]. Section 11 
of the license states that “[e]ach contributor grants you a non-exclusive, worldwide, 
royalty-free patent license under the contributor’s essential patent claims, to make, use, 
sell, offer for sale, import and otherwise run, modify and propagate the contents of its 
contributor version.” Id. § 11. Earlier versions of the GPL, such as GPLv2, used by Linux 
and MySQL, do not expressly provide for a royalty-free patent license. At the same time, 
commentators have assumed that such earlier versions also provide for an implicit 
royalty-free patent license. See, e.g., FREE SOFTWARE FOUND., GPLV3 FIRST DISCUSSION 
DRAFT RATIONALE 17 (2006), http://gplv3.fsf.org/gpl-rationale-2006-01-16.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/SGK4-U8Z3] (“GPLv3 provides an explicit patent license covering any patents 
held by the program’s developers, replacing the implicit license on which GPLv2 relies”); 
see also LAWRENCE ROSEN, OPEN SOURCE LICENSING: SOFTWARE FREEDOM AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 79, 126 (2004) (discussing implied patent rights in the 
BSD and GPLv2 licenses). 
67 See, e.g., Apache License, supra note 63, § 3 (noting that the patent license “applies 
only to those patent claims licensable by such Contributor that are necessarily infringed 
by their Contribution(s) alone or by combination of their Contribution(s) with the Work 
to which such Contribution(s) was submitted”); GPLv3, supra note 66, § 11 (providing 
that the patent license does “not include claims that would be infringed only as a 
consequence of further modification” of the work); see also FREE SOFTWARE FOUND., 
GPLV3 THIRD DISCUSSION DRAFT RATIONALE 29 (2007), http://gplv3.fsf.org/gpl3-dd3-
rationale.pdf [https://perma.cc/9XV9-DZUF] (discussing limitations to the scope of the 
patent license in GPLv3); ROSEN, supra note 66, at 147–54 (discussing Mozilla’s Public 
License, which expressly provided a patent license but included restrictions). 
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licenses provide that the royalty-free grants will terminate against 
users that commence patent infringement litigation against the li-
censed work.68 This latter provision, in restricting patent infringe-
ment suits against the licensed software, in effect conditions the 
royalty-free open source patent license on the user’s grant of a re-
ciprocal royalty-free license. 
In addition, the GPL conditions its own patent license on a par-
ticularly unique non-monetary bargain. Users of GPL software 
commit to continue distributing any modifications or developments 
to that software under the same GPL terms.69 In other words, the 
licensee of GPL software is free to continue the development of the 
software, but she is not free to change the license terms of any fur-
ther developments, and any downstream user of the software (in-
cluding any improved version of the software) must be provided 
with the software source code and the same rights as the original 
licensee. Users that do not satisfy this non-monetary “copyleft” 
requirement can have their patent licenses terminated.70 In other 
words, as with other royalty-free commitments, the royalty-free 
licenses provided under the GPL are not traded for money, but ra-
ther for a kind of reciprocal grant of intellectual property rights. 
Some firms, eschewing relatively complicated open source li-
censes like the GPL, may choose to license software under simple 
free software licenses that do not contain any patent provisions. At 
the same time, such relatively simple licenses are often supple-
mented with additional language containing express royalty-free 
patent licenses. Google, for example, uses the plain BSD open 
                                                                                                                            
68 Apache License, supra note 63, § 3 (“If You institute patent litigation . . . alleging that 
the Work or a Contribution incorporated within the Work constitutes . . . patent 
infringement, then any patent licenses granted to You under this License for that Work 
shall terminate as of the date such litigation is filed.”); GPLv3, supra note 66, § 10 
(providing that “you may not initiate litigation . . . alleging that any patent claim is 
infringed by making, using, selling, offering for sale, or importing the Program or any 
portion of it”); see also FREE SOFTWARE FOUND., supra note 67, at 29 (“Read together, 
sections 8, 10 and 11 [of GPLv3] establish a patent termination condition for GPLv3, the 
scope of which is no narrower than that of the Apache/EPL variety of retaliation 
clause.”). 
69 ROSEN, supra note 66, at 103–04. 
70 See GPLv3, supra note 66, § 8 (“Any attempt otherwise to propagate or modify it is 
void, and will automatically terminate your rights under this License (including any 
patent licenses granted under the third paragraph of section 11).”). 
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source license to provide software implementing WebM technolo-
gy.71 The short and simple BSD license does not contain a patent 
license,72 but Google supplements the BSD license with an “Addi-
tional IP Rights Grant” which contains an express royalty-free pa-
tent license.73 Google’s additional language clearly delimits the 
scope of the patent license.74 Facebook also employs a similar strat-
egy of providing software under the BSD license supplemented by 
additional royalty-free patent license terms.75 
D. Defensive Arrangements 
Defensive patent arrangements also typically contain royalty-
free patent licenses. Patent holders use intellectual property “de-
fensively” when their primary goal is to escape the menace of pa-
tent litigation, rather than to exclude competitors or to receive 
monetary compensation.76 As an illustration, semiconductor firms 
often cross-license their enormous patent portfolios—with each 
party granting the other a license to its own collection of patents.77 
Such arrangements may often be royalty-free, highlighting the fact 
that neither firm in such transaction seeks to monetize its patents 
                                                                                                                            
71 WebM is a media format standard intended to provide royalty-free technology for 
Internet audio and video. See About WebM, WEBM PROJECT, http://www.webmproject. 
org/about/ [https://perma.cc/5ZYC-KTQA] (last visited Oct. 11, 2016); WebM FAQ, 
WEBM PROJECT,  http://www.webmproject.org/about/faq/ [https://perma.cc/HLC9-
78RT] (last modified Sept. 1, 2015). 
72 The BSD license used by WebM is available at Software License, WEBM PROJECT,  
http://www.webmproject.org/license/software/ [https://perma.cc/3DPP-WX5H] (last 
visited Oct. 12, 2016). 
73 Additional IP Rights Grant (Patents), WEBM PROJECT, http://www.webmproject.org/ 
license/additional/ [https://perma.cc/RJ42-RZZP] (last visited Oct. 11, 2016). 
74 Id. 
75 See Mike Arpaia, Update Patent Grant, GITHUB (Apr. 10, 2015), https://github. 
com/facebook/osquery/blob/master/PATENTS [https://perma.cc/LKW9-zFU9F]; 
James Pierce, Updating Our Open Source Patent Grant, FACEBOOK CODE (Apr. 10, 2015), 
https://code.facebook.com/posts/1639473982937255/updating-our-open-source-patent-
grant/ [https://perma.cc/44WX-E5PU]. 
76 Jason Schultz & Jennifer M. Urban, Protecting Open Innovation: The Defensive Patent 
License as a New Approach to Patent Threats, Transaction Costs, and Tactical Disarmament, 
26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 6 (2013). 
77 For a general discussion of defensive patenting practices, see Mark A. Lemley, 
Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1889, 
1949 (2002). Patent cross-licenses are not always royalty-free, and sometimes provide for 
equalizing royalty payments. Id. at 1949 n.249. For a more extensive discussion of patent 
practices in the semiconductor industry, see infra text accompanying notes 230–33. 
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through the receipt of royalties, but instead trades its patent rights 
for the freedom to continue its own independent commercial oper-
ations. 
Threats of patent litigation have sired a range of public defen-
sive patent arrangements. Such arrangements, though they do not 
facilitate collaborative development, leverage the multilateral co-
operation of a broad range of interests. The Open Invention Net-
work (“OIN”), for example, provides a “shared defensive patent 
pool with the mission to protect” the Linux operating system.78 
OIN operates by acquiring patents covering Linux and providing its 
members with royalty-free licenses for those patents.79 In exchange 
for this royalty-free license, each member further grants reciprocal 
royalty-free licenses to both the OIN and to all other OIN mem-
bers.80 The complex royalty-free licensing relationships created by 
OIN are non-discriminatory in the sense that each participant loses 
control over the identity of its licensees. Participants grant zero-
rate licenses to all other current and future OIN licensees, without 
any means of determining or controlling the identity of such future 
licensees.81 As with other royalty-free commitments, the cross-
licenses granted by OIN members are limited in scope.82 As usual, 
the OIN license also contains “defensive termination” clauses, 
which provide that the royalty-free license may be terminated for 
                                                                                                                            
78 About OIN, OPEN INVENTION NETWORK, http://www.openinventionnetwork.com/ 
about-us/ [https://perma.cc/SA8S-8XAL] (last visited Oct. 11, 2016). 
79 OIN License Agreement, OPEN INVENTION NETWORK § 1.1, http:// 
www.openinventionnetwork.com/joining-oin/oin-license-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/ 
AE3B-UGBD] (last visited Oct. 11, 2016). 
80 See Joining OIN, OPEN INVENTION NETWORK,  http://www.openinventionnetwork. 
com/joining-oin/ [https://perma.cc/56WJ-DL5P] (last visited Oct. 11, 2016) (describing 
in general terms the royalty-free licenses granted by the OIN and the royalty-free cross-
licensing granted by all licensees for certain Linux technology); see also OIN License 
Agreement, supra note 79, § 1.1 (providing an OIN license to members); id. § 1.2 
(describing members’ cross license). 
81 OIN participants may elect to retreat from providing rights to future licensees, but 
such determination curtails the participants benefits under the OIN license and does not 
revoke any rights from licensees that joined prior to such election. See OIN License 
Agreement, supra note 79, § 2.2. 
82 Each OIN member’s cross-license is limited to patent claims covering the “Linux 
System,” which is defined in extraordinarily meticulous detail. Linux System, OPEN 
INVENTION NETWORK, http://www.openinventionnetwork.com/joining-oin/linux-
system [https://perma.cc/FMB4-TKLT] (last visited Oct. 11, 2016). The scope of the 
definition excludes a wide range of functionality. Id. 
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members that commence patent litigation against other members’ 
use of Linux.83 
Other non-discriminatory zero-rate defensive arrangements in-
clude the Defensive Patent License (“DPL”), a legal mechanism in 
which patentees commit to use their rights for defensive purposes 
only.84 The goal of the DPL is to construct a decentralized yet 
coordinated community that can protect innovators from aggres-
sive patent infringement litigation.85 Each DPL patentee grants all 
other DPL participants a broad, royalty-free patent license.86 The 
patentee remains free to assert its patents against entities that do 
not join the defensive DPL arrangement, and may also assert its 
patents defensively against participants that, in violation of the 
provisions of the DPL, assert patent infringement claims against 
it.87 As with the OIN, the DPL arrangement is non-discriminatory: 
As participants do not know the identity of future DPL partici-
pants, they cannot choose which firms will be their future zero-rate 
licensees. 
E. Motivations 
Zero-rate commitments may not be directed toward monetary 
rewards, but they are frequently employed in the pursuit of specific 
commercial goals. Moreover, to the extent a royalty-free arrange-
ment is intended to facilitate collaborative development, the struc-
ture of the royalty-free commitment can significantly impact the 
organization of the community that coalesces around that arrange-
ment. This Section illuminates the commercial calculations that 
                                                                                                                            
83 OIN License Agreement, supra note 79, § 3.3 (noting that a licensee may suspend its 
royalty-free cross-licenses against a member that commences patent litigation against 
“products that perform substantially the same function as the Linux System”); id. § 3.4 
(stating that royalty-free licenses granted by OIN terminate when a licensee commences 
patent litigation against Linux). 
84 See generally Schultz & Urban, supra note 76. See also DEFENSIVE PAT. LICENSE, 
http://www.defensivepatentlicense.org/ [https://perma.cc/TU69-XGKQ] (last visited 
Oct. 11, 2016). The text of the DPL is available at The Defensive Patent License 1.1, 
DEFENSIVE PAT. LICENSE,  http://www.defensivepatentlicense.org/content/defensive-
patent-license [https://perma.cc/E8CG-J54H] (last visited Oct. 11, 2016). 
85 Schultz & Urban, supra note 76. 
86 The Defensive Patent License 1.1, supra note 84, § 1. 
87 Id. § 2(e)(i). 
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motivate royalty-free commitments, and the community models 
that can spring from such arrangements. 
From a commercial perspective, royalty-free licensing com-
mitments can foster the development of profitable markets. For 
example, a firm that manufactures USB or Bluetooth devices may 
determine that the potential benefits of marketing the device sur-
pass the probable value of monetizing the patents. Such firms can 
provide powerful incentives for the broad adoption of USB or Blu-
etooth standards—and for the sale of their own devices implement-
ing those standards—by providing public assurances that any pa-
tents covering the standard will be made available royalty-free.88 In 
the same way, royalty-free commitments outside a standards de-
velopment process can encourage other firms to invest in the de-
velopment, improvement, and marketing of the same freely availa-
ble technology.89 In these ways, the commercial effect of zero-rate 
licensing pledges is similar to the much-analyzed FRAND com-
                                                                                                                            
88 See AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT PATENT POLICY MANUAL 57 (Jorge 
L. Contreras ed., 2007) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS MANUAL] (describing how royalty-
free commitments are sometimes adopted “[w]here the possible imposition of royalties is 
likely to affect adoption negatively”); Jorge L. Contreras, Patent Pledges, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
543, 576–77 (2015) (“In some cases, they [patent holders] may determine that the 
benefits of broad, rapidly-available interoperability are so great that they prefer all 
participants to license their relevant patents on a royalty-free basis, thus eliminating any 
patent-related barrier to adoption of the standard.”); Russell, supra note 28, at 167 
(explaining that W3C members held extensive patent portfolios but supported royalty-
free standards since a “royalty-free Web would provide a platform for better growth and 
revenue opportunities”); Timothy S. Simcoe et al., Competing on Standards? 
Entrepreneurship, Intellectual Property and Platform Technologies, 18 J. ECON. & MGMT. 
STRATEGY 775, 780 (2009) (observing that firms agree to royalty-free licensing of 
standards because they “hope to benefit from product development lead times, 
backwards compatibility, or the existence of proprietary complements”). 
89 Tesla’s royalty-free commitment, for example, was expressly made for the purpose 
of incentivizing other firms to invest in developing the “enormous” market for electric 
cars. Musk, supra note 54. Tesla announced that it would benefit from jump-starting that 
market with its patent pledge, since its “true competition is not the small trickle of non-
Tesla electric cars being produced, but rather the enormous flood of gasoline cars pouring 
out of the world’s factories every day.” Id.; see also Contreras, supra note 88, at 583 
(describing how patent pledges are used to encourage the development of specific 
markets); Anne Layne-Farrar, Moving Past the SEP RAND Obsession: Some Thoughts on the 
Economic Implications of Unilateral Commitments and the Complexities of Patent Licensing, 21 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 1093, 1099 (2014) (arguing that unilateral licensing commitments 
“might slow (or stop altogether) the adoption of a competing de facto standard, or might 
reduce rivals’ incentives to invest in the development of alternative technologies”). 
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mitment.90 In both situations the patent holder surrenders some of 
its rights in order to promote the adoption of, and investment into, 
certain technology, except that, by committing to a zero-rate royal-
ty, a patent owner sacrifices even more of its legal rights and there-
by provides potentially greater incentives toward adoption of the 
technology. 
Open source licenses (with their royalty-free patent provisions) 
are often directed toward similar objectives. Firms may release 
software under open source licenses in order to encourage the 
broad adoption of the software in the market, perhaps expecting to 
profit from a complementary product.91 Open source licenses en-
courage such product adoption by restraining the software owner 
from abusing the investments of users and developers, since once 
the product owner has provided open source rights, it cannot legal-
ly remove the product from the market or control its develop-
ment.92 Such wide adoption of the freely available open source 
product can boost the market for the patentee’s own more profita-
ble proprietary goods. Google’s Android operating system provides 
a classic example of this commercial strategy: Google gives away 
Android at no charge under an open source license, since it expects 
to profit from the complementary market of Internet advertising.93 
                                                                                                                            
90 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, A Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable 
Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1135, 1137 (2013) (stating 
that FRAND commitments “promote the standard by assuring companies implementing 
the standard that they will not be blocked from bringing their products to market or held 
up so long as they are willing to pay reasonable royalties for any standard-essential 
patents”). For a longer description of the purpose and structure of FRAND 
commitments, see discussion infra Section II.C. 
91 JOSH LERNER & MARK SCHANKERMAN, THE COMINGLED CODE: OPEN SOURCE AND 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 50, 74 (2010); WEBER, supra note 61, at 195–96 (“Loss leaders 
give away open source software as a way of generating demand and seeding a larger 
market for a linked commercial product.”); Jonathan M. Barnett, The Host’s Dilemma: 
Strategic Forfeiture In Platform Markets For Informational Goods, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1861, 
1893 (2011). 
92 WEBER, supra note 61, at 193 (stating that open source “dramatically reduces the 
potential for supplier lock-in” and solves the problem of “asset-specific investments by 
customers”); Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 
183, 193 (2004) (The open source Linux operating system “comes without the threat of 
leverage and dominance that are always present with a proprietary operating system. IBM 
customers can commit to Linux without any fear that IBM will take advantage of them.”). 
93 See LEVY, supra note 63, at 214; see also Merges, supra note 92, at 191 (asserting that 
IBM supports Linux because operating systems are “increasingly an input into [IBM’s] 
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Though zero-rate licensors may provide rights without de-
manding cash compensation, they do not ordinarily mean to relin-
quish all of their legal rights.94 As detailed above, royalty-free li-
censes and commitments typically contain significant non-
monetary provisions, and these non-monetary provisions are often 
structured toward advancing the same commercial goals underlying 
the license. For example, as shown above, scope limitations are a 
common non-monetary provision of royalty-free commitments.95 
Such limitations further the commercial goals of the royalty-free 
commitment by directing industry participants toward the adoption 
of the specific technology covered by the commitment, and away 
from other competing technologies outside the license scope.96 
Moreover, as noted, patentees often make technology available 
royalty-free but hope to profit from collateral products.97 Scope 
limitations can serve to differentiate the rights that a patentee 
wishes to make freely available from the complementary rights 
that, not being covered by the royalty-free commitment, the paten-
tee wishes to reserve for its own business.98 
                                                                                                                            
main product lines” of “network management, collaboration tools, and databases” as 
well as complimentary “consulting services and computer hardware”). 
94 See Tsilas, supra note 19, at 112 (Even the royalty-free W3C patent policy permits 
“reasonable terms and conditions.” Such terms and conditions can include “field-of-use 
restrictions, reciprocity requirements, and restrictions on sublicensing.”). 
95 Commentators have recognized the importance of such scope restrictions, both to 
the patentee as well as to the standard as a whole. See Brad Bittle et al., The Expanding 
Role and Importance of Standards in the Information and Communications Technology 
Industry, 52 JURIMETRICS J. 177, 195–96 (2012) (describing how the scope of a license 
commitment can be the subject of “protracted negotiations” with “profound 
ramifications”); Brian Kahin, Common and Uncommon Knowledge: Reducing Conflict 
Between Standards and Patents, in OPENING STANDARDS: THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF 
INTEROPERABILITY, supra note 19, at 177, 179 (“Even if implicated patents are licensed 
royalty-free, the patent holder may confine the license to the practicing of the standard as 
written, in effect limiting free implementation and further evolution of the standard.”). 
96 See Layne-Farrar, supra note 89, at 1099 (describing how unilateral patent pledges 
can discourage investment in competing technologies). 
97 See supra text accompanying notes 91–93. 
98 See Layne-Farrar, supra note 89, at 1102 (describing how license commitments may 
be structured to include “supporting-role patents” but exclude “differentiating 
patents”). 
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Zero-rate licenses also frequently include non-monetary terms 
of reciprocity and defensive termination.99 These provisions can 
similarly advance the commercial goals underlying a royalty-free 
commitment, because they aim to allow the patentee to focus on 
development and marketing without the distractions of patent in-
fringement lawsuits. Reciprocal license provisions, for example, 
expressly seize intellectual property rights that could otherwise be 
used to attack the patentee.100 Defensive termination provisions 
similarly provide patentees with some protection against patent 
infringement suits.101 Moreover, to the extent the patentee is mar-
keting its devices in the context of a specific technological stan-
                                                                                                                            
99 Commentators have recognized the frequent appearance of such provisions in 
license commitments. See, e.g., Contreras, supra note 38, at 167 (describing “reciprocity, 
grantbacks, defensive suspension” provisions as “customary practices”); see also Lemley 
& Shapiro supra note 90, at 1156 (“A patentee that makes a FRAND commitment to an 
SSO covering a particular standard may reasonably expect that others with essential 
patents covering the same standard will make the same commitment.”); U.S. DEP’T 
JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 9 n.21 (1995), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/
legacy/2006/04/27/0558.pdf [https://perma.cc/JVU8-QE9B] [hereinafter ANTITRUST 
/IP GUIDELINES] (noting that “technology may be licensed royalty-free in exchange for 
the right to use other technology”). For a general description of the range of possible 
reciprocal provisions, see KEITH MASKUS ET AL., PATENT CHALLENGES FOR STANDARD-
SETTING IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: LESSONS FROM INFORMATION AND 
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY 46 (2013). 
100 MASKUS ET AL., supra note 99; see also ABA STANDARDS MANUAL, supra note 88, at 
56 (describing the effect of the provisions implementing reciprocity). 
101 See HEATHER MEEKER, OPEN (SOURCE) FOR BUSINESS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO OPEN 
SOURCE SOFTWARE LICENSING 167 (2015) (discussing the use of open source defensive 
provisions to defend against patent litigation); Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 90, at 1156 
(arguing that defensive suspension provisions help protect the members of standards 
organizations from “hold-up” by non-members). Defensive and reciprocal provisions 
have not been without controversy. Officials in the Justice Department have opined that 
licensees should have the option to license FRAND-encumbered patents “on a cash-only 
basis”—in other words, without any defensive or reciprocal obligations. Renata Hesse, 
Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice Antitrust Div., Remarks as Prepared 
for the ITU-T Patent Roundtable: Six “Small” Proposals for SSOs Before Lunch 9–10 
(Oct. 10, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/518951/download [https://perma.cc/ 
3V6J-GX6H]. These officials have also opined that standard organizations should 
“prohibit the mandatory cross-licensing of patents that are not essential to the standard 
or a related family of standards.” Id.; see also Kai-Uwe Kuhn et al., Standard Setting 
Organizations Can Help Solve the Standard Essential Patents Licensing Problem, CPI 
ANTITRUST CHRON., Mar. 2013, at 4–5 (FRAND licensors should be required to “specify 
a cash price for its SEPs. . . . Determining if a complex package of cross-licenses satisfies 
F/RAND is difficult for a third party.”). 
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dard, reciprocal and defensive provisions may also promote the 
standard itself by mitigating the risk of patent litigation for all firms 
implementing the standard.102 
The non-monetary “copyleft” obligations of the GPL (and 
similar open source licenses) can also play a crucial role in advanc-
ing certain commercial models. For example, under a “dual-
licensing” model, firms may provide “teaser” software products at 
no charge (i.e., royalty-free) under the GPL and then, once the user 
has decided to adopt the product, grant additional rights for mone-
tary compensation.103 The initial GPL, by allowing free use of the 
software, can foster broad adoption and encourage the develop-
ment of a community around the product.104 At the same time, the 
GPL’s copyleft provisions encourage licensees to purchase com-
mercial software licenses that do not impose the copyleft 
“pain.”105 
Non-monetary requirements can also play an important role in 
encouraging participation in a standards process or open source 
community or, indeed, in structuring the architecture of the colla-
borative community itself. For example, by narrowing the scope of 
the royalty-free license, standards organizations can encourage the 
participation of patentees that would otherwise be put off by a 
                                                                                                                            
102 See ABA STANDARDS MANUAL, supra note 88, at 64 (describing how defensive 
suspension provisions may be used to implement “universal reciprocity . . . among all 
Implementers of the Standard”); see also MASKUS ET AL., supra note 99, at 46 (explaining 
how reciprocity conditions can sometimes be extended to “all implementers” of the 
standard). 
103 See, e.g., HEATHER MEEKER, THE OPEN SOURCE ALTERNATIVE: UNDERSTANDING 
RISKS AND LEVERAGING OPPORTUNITIES 143 (2008) (describing dual-licensing business 
models); ROSEN, supra note 66, at 262 (discussing dual-licensing business models). 
104 See Michael Olson, Dual Licensing, in OPEN SOURCES 2.0: THE CONTINUING 
EVOLUTION 78 (Chris DiBona et al. eds., 2005) (asserting that in dual-licensing structures 
the “open source product is ubiquitous as a result of an inexpensive distribution 
channel”). 
105 Id. at 83 (arguing that dual-licensing structures only work with software licenses that 
“cause enough pain that some users would rather pay money than endure the pain”). 
The dual-licensing strategy is prominently employed by Oracle in its distribution of the 
MySQL database software. Oracle makes a version of MySQL available under the terms 
of the GPL, and a version of MySQL with additional tools and support available for 
monetary compensation. This dual-licensing model was well-described by the European 
Commission in its decision allowing the merger of Oracle with Sun Microsystems. See 
Commission Decision COMP/M.5529, slip op. ¶¶ 234-51 (Jan. 21, 2010), cited in 2010 
O.J. (C 91) 7. 
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broad licensing commitment. Scope limitations can be particularly 
important for zero-rate arrangements where the patentee relin-
quishes almost all rights to monetize the patent, since patentees 
could be reluctant to participate in such frameworks were they not 
narrowly constructed to sweep in only cherry-picked patents.106 
The royalty-free patent provisions in open source licenses are simi-
larly limited in scope to the specific software provided by the licen-
sor.107 This limitation encourages participation in the open source 
community, since potential participants may otherwise be deterred 
by open source patent licenses of unmanageably broad scope.108 
Defensive and reciprocal provisions may similarly encourage 
otherwise hesitant patentees to participate in a collaborative 
framework.109 These non-monetary licensing conditions permit 
participants to have their cake and eat it too: to provide the licens-
                                                                                                                            
106 See Bittle et al., supra note 95, at 195 (asserting that “[a]n IP Policy that has an overly 
broad application . . . could have the unintentional impact of limiting the number of 
industry players that are willing to participate in that SSO”); Michele K. Herman, 
Negotiating Standards-Related Patent Licenses: How the Deal is Done, 3 LANDSLIDE 31 
(2010) (noting that the scope of royalty-free patent licenses is ordinarily more limited 
than the scope of FRAND licenses); Tsilas, supra note 19, at 112 (arguing that 
“prohibiting other reasonable licensing terms . . . would likely deter patent holders from 
participating in and contributing to the standards development process”); cf. Anne 
Layne-Farrar & Josh Lerner, To Join or Not to Join: Examining Patent Pool Participation 
and Rent Sharing Rules, 29 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 294, 297 (2011) (hypothesizing that 
royalty-free licensing results in lower rates of patent pool participation). 
107 See sources cited supra note 67. 
108 See FREE SOFTWARE FOUND., supra note 67, at 18 (stating that if overbroad “patent 
license requirements convince patent-holding companies to remain outside the 
distribution path of all GPL-covered software, then these requirements, no matter how 
strong, will cover few patents”). Such scope limitations can be particularly important for 
open source licenses where the user is permitted to modify and develop the licensed 
software—though the software itself can grow and change over time, the scope of the 
patent license remains narrowly targeted to further the adoption of the patentee’s own 
products. Id. at 20 (The “claim set” covered by GPLv3 “cannot expand as a work is 
further modified downstream. If it could, then any software patent claim would be 
included, since any software patent claim can be infringed by some further modification of 
the work.” (parentheses omitted)). 
109 Jason W. Croft, Going Green: Why Companies Are Offering Environmentally 
Responsible Technologies, 19 SE. ENVTL. L.J. 97, 104 (2010) (noting that the defensive 
termination provisions of the Eco-Patent Commons “should motivate companies to join” 
the organization); Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 90, at 1156 (stating that “defensive 
suspension helps . . . encourage[] participation in the FRAND commitment and perhaps 
the SSO itself”). But see ROSEN, supra note 66, at 215–17 (discussing how overbroad 
defensive provisions discourage use of open source software). 
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ing commitment but to simultaneously retain the rights to use the 
committed patents defensively when confronted with potential pa-
tent litigation. These provisions can reassure potential participants 
that their involvement in a standards process or open source devel-
opment will not be abused by potential rivals.110 Again, such non-
monetary provisions can be particularly important in royalty-free 
commitments where participants otherwise disclaim rights to mo-
netize the patent.111 
Significantly, non-monetary provisions can be important to the 
architecture of a collaborative community. The reciprocal obliga-
tions of the GPL, for example, push project participants toward 
collaboration rather than competition. Since all contributors are 
required to preserve the open nature of the project, no participant 
is incentivized to develop its own unique and distinctive features.112 
In this way, the GPL framework can limit the chance that any tech-
nology will fragment into a range of different implementations. 
These centripetal incentives can also affect the institutional struc-
tures of collaboration. Projects that do not use the GPL-like copy-
left licenses, for instance, may require stronger corporate and go-
vernance frameworks to produce the same collaborative invest-
ments.113 
                                                                                                                            
110 Croft, supra note 109, at 104 (The defensive termination provision of the Eco-Patent 
Commons “provides a significant advantage to pledging a patent . . . over donating it to 
the public . . . because pledgers are still able to exclude competitors or bad faith users 
from using their patents.”); Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 90, at 1156 (stating that 
“defensive suspension helps protect SSO members from holdup by non-members”). 
111 See Tsilas, supra note 19, at 99; see also JUSTUS BARON & DANIEL F. SPULBER, 
TECHNOLOGY STANDARDS AND STANDARDS ORGANIZATIONS: INTRODUCTION TO THE 
SEARLE CENTER DATABASE 20 (2015) (noting that provisions which condition licensing 
commitments on reciprocity are more frequent for royalty-free policies). 
112 ANDREW M. ST. LAURENT, UNDERSTANDING OPEN SOURCE AND FREE SOFTWARE 
LICENSING 173 (2004) (stating that the “GPL limits the likelihood of forks by preventing 
non-open development”); WEBER, supra note 61, at 181 (contrasting the GPL with more 
permissive licenses, where in the latter the “looseness of the license . . . has caused 
problems and dissention about what is legitimate behavior”); Greg R. Vetter, The 
Collaborative Integrity of Open-Source Software, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 563, 641 (noting that 
the permissive licensing of certain BSD Unix projects inhibited “inter-entity 
collaboration”). But see ST. LAURENT, supra at 33 (Fragmentation in BSD projects is “less 
a result of the dynamic of the license itself than it is of the complex social dynamic 
involved in large software projects.”). 
113 See Bruce Kogut & Anca Metiu, Open Source Software Development and Distributed 
Information, 17 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 248, 257 (2001) (Linux prevents 
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In sum, royalty-free grants serve deliberate objectives. These 
frameworks are often structured to support commercial business 
models, and can also play an important part in shaping collabora-
tive communities. The royalty-free commitment advances these 
goals not only through the surrender of the right to monetize the 
patent itself, but also through the various non-monetary require-
ments and obligations that surround the core royalty-free commit-
ment. These associated non-monetary provisions focus the thrust 
of the commitment, protect it from being abused by competitors, 
and assist in mobilizing a collaborative community around the 
committed technology. Later sections of the Article examine the 
remedies available to a patentee for the breach of these non-
monetary requirements. 
II. LICENSING AND INJUNCTIONS 
Patent license commitments can dramatically impact the range 
of remedies available to a patentee. The Patent Act permits (but 
does not require) courts to grant injunctions prohibiting infringers 
from using the patented technology.114 This right to an injunction is 
grounded in the recognition that patents, being a form of property, 
can grant their owners a right to exclude others from the use of the 
patented technology.115 Even so, a growing consensus of courts and 
                                                                                                                            
“balkanization” through the restrictions of the GPL license, while Apache, with its more 
permissive licensing, requires governance structures to attain the same.); Nathan Willis, 
Permissive Licenses, Community, and Copyleft, LWN (Oct. 14, 2015), https://lwn.net/ 
Articles/660428/ [https://perma.cc/M353-GN6G] (Open source projects using 
permissive licenses, such as the Apache 2.0 license, “are top-heavy with ‘governance’ 
structures,” while in projects using copyleft licenses “those structures are simply not 
needed.”); see also Barnett, supra note 91, at 1896 (presenting different commitment 
devices used by open source projects, and differentiating between the commitments 
resulting from licensing models and the commitments resulting from governance 
structures). 
114 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2012) (providing that courts “may grant injunctions in accordance 
with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent”). 
115 Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980) (noting that it is 
“the long-settled view that the essence of a patent grant is the right to exclude others 
from profiting by the patented invention”); Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 
U.S. 386, 415 (1945) (“That a patent is property, protected against appropriation both by 
individuals and by government, has long been settled.”); Carl Schenck, A.G. v. Nortron 
Corp., 713 F.2d 782, 786 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“The patent right is but the right to 
exclude others, the very definition of ‘property.’”). 
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administrative agencies has restricted the availability of injunctions 
for patents indiscriminately licensed by their owners. These limita-
tions have not been expressly applied to royalty-free (as opposed to 
FRAND) licensing commitments, though much of the logic in 
these decisions would facially dictate a similar approach. This Part 
follows the development of these curbs on injunctive relief and 
summarizes the legal and economic rationales for these limitations. 
A. eBay and its Progeny 
The 2006 Supreme Court decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange 
L.L.C.116 dramatically changed the patent remedies landscape. The 
patentee MercExchange was a start-up that, having failed to market 
its patented technology, began pursuing a commercial licensing 
strategy instead.117 MercExchange asserted that its patents covered 
eBay’s “Buy it Now” feature, which allowed users to buy an auc-
tioned product at a set price prior to the conclusion of the auc-
tion.118 eBay began discussions with MercExchange for the pur-
chase of those patents, but the parties never came to an agree-
ment.119 MercExchange then brought suit in federal court, asserting 
patent infringement by eBay, and a federal district court jury 
agreed. 120 
Prior to 2006, the ordinary rule was that courts would almost 
automatically issue injunctions to plaintiffs that had proven in-
fringement of their patent.121 Courts would generally presume that 
                                                                                                                            
116 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
117 For background on MercExchange, and its commercial strategy and failures, see 
Ryan T. Holte, Trolls or Great Inventors: Case Studies of Patent Assertion Entities, 59 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 23–29 (2014). 
118 Associated Press, EBay Settles Patent Dispute Over ‘Buy It Now’ Feature, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 29, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/29/technology/29ebay.html?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/5LYQ-WZJ2]. 
119 See Holte, supra  note 117, at 28–29. 
120 See MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 698 (E.D. Va. 2003). 
121 Prior to eBay, the Federal Circuit recognized that a district court has the discretion 
whether to enter an injunction. See eBay, 547 U.S. at 394 (citing Roche Prods., Inc. v. 
Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 865 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). At the same time, however, the 
Federal Circuit indicated that “an injunction should issue once infringement has been 
established unless there is a sufficient reason for denying it.” W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. 
v. Garlock, Inc., 842 F.2d 1275, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 1988). According to the court, only 
limited reasons that were “sufficiently exceptional” could justify the “rare” case of not 
granting an injunction. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. 
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patent infringement resulted in “irreparable harm” to the paten-
tee—harm that could not be rectified by money damages alone—
and, as such, courts would routinely enjoin continued infringe-
ment.122 Even so, and notwithstanding a jury finding of infringe-
ment, the eBay district court refused to issue an injunction prohi-
biting eBay’s use of the patented technology.123 The court held that 
MercExchange had failed to show that, absent an injunction, con-
tinued infringement of the patents by eBay would cause it “irrepar-
able harm.”124 In support of this holding, the district court pointed 
to the fact that MercExchange did not “practice its inventions” 
but rather existed “merely to license its patented technology to 
others.”125 Moreover, the plaintiff had made “numerous com-
ments to the media . . . that it did not seek to enjoin eBay but rather 
sought appropriate damages for the infringement.”126 Given Mer-
cExchange’s business model, the district court held that money 
damages (without an injunction) would provide sufficient remedy 
for the infringement of its patents.127 
The Federal Circuit reversed on appeal.128 Reiterating the 
“general rule” that “a permanent injunction will issue” in patent 
cases “once infringement and validity have been adjudged,”129 the 
court held that the facts at hand were not “sufficiently exception-
al”130 to justify a departure from the ordinary rule. Injunctions, ac-
cording to the court, were the “natural consequence of the right to 
exclude”131 granted by a patent, so the court held that MercEx-
                                                                                                                            
Cir. 2005), rev’d, 547 U.S. 388 (2006). As such, the “general rule” in patent 
infringement cases was “that a permanent injunction will issue once infringement and 
validity have been adjudged.” MercExchange, 401 F.3d at 1339. 
122 See Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142, 1148 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(describing the presumption of irreparable harm in pre-eBay patent cases). For a 
discussion of which kind of harms cannot be rectified by money damages, see David 
McGowan, Irreparable Harm, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 577, 586–88 (2010). 
123 MercExchange, 275 F. Supp. 2d at 715. 
124 Id. at 712. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 715. 
128 MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
129 Id. at 1338. 
130 Id. at 1339. 
131 Id. 
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change should be entitled to an injunction no less than other paten-
tees. 
The Supreme Court overturned the decision of the Federal 
Circuit, holding that the almost automatic issuance of injunctions 
in patent cases was inconsistent with the statutory language of the 
Patent Act and “traditional equitable principles.”132 According to 
the Court, nothing in the patent context demanded that such prin-
ciples be skirted in favor of injunctive relief.133 Instead, the Court 
ruled that a patentee seeking an injunction must demonstrate the 
“traditional” four factors: 
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that 
remedies available at law, such as monetary damag-
es, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) 
that, considering the balance of hardships between 
the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is 
warranted; and (4) that the public interest would 
not be disserved by a permanent injunction.134 
The Supreme Court criticized the holdings of both the appeals 
and district court as inconsistent with this four-factor test.135 The 
appeals court, by insisting that almost all patent infringement in-
evitably caused “irreparable injury,” had construed the equitable 
standard too favorably for the patentee.136 The district court, in as-
suming that a patentee’s willingness to license its technology pro-
duced a “categorical rule”137 against injunctions, had construed the 
equitable standard too favorably for infringers. 
Even as the Supreme Court held that “traditional equitable 
principles” provided the proper standard for determining whether 
injunctive relief was the proper remedy for infringement, it also 
implied that a patentee’s licensing strategy could, in many cases, 
affect the application of those principles. The Court identified two 
specific situations where a patentee’s licensing strategy was not 
inconsistent with the grant of an injunction. According to the 
                                                                                                                            
132 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392–93 (2006). 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 393. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 393–94. 
137 Id. at 393. 
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Court, patentees “such as university researchers or self-made in-
ventors, might reasonably prefer to license their patents, rather 
than undertake efforts to secure the financing necessary to bring 
their works to market themselves,”138 and, as such, these specific 
categories of patentees may be eligible for injunctive relief under 
the appropriate equitable standard. By distinguishing these two rel-
atively irregular fact patterns, the Court suggested that in many 
other situations a willingness to license may indeed be inconsistent 
with the grant of an injunction.139 In particular, a concurring opi-
nion by Justice Kennedy emphasized that injunctions may not be 
appropriate in situations “in which firms use patents . . . primarily 
for obtaining licensing fees,” since, in these circumstances, the in-
junction may be “employed as a bargaining tool to charge exorbi-
tant fees.”140 
The cases that followed eBay further detailed the burden that 
patentees must satisfy in order to obtain injunctive relief.141 Courts 
have generally found that plaintiffs satisfy that burden when they 
demonstrate that the injury from ongoing infringement would be 
difficult to quantify in monetary terms.142 Injury that is difficult to 
measure could be the loss of market share or customers,143 a reduc-
                                                                                                                            
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
141 See, e.g., Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142, 1149 (Fed. Cir. 
2011) (clarifying that eBay “jettisoned the presumption of irreparable harm as it applies to 
determining the appropriateness of injunctive relief”). 
142 See Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 801 F.3d 1352, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Reyna, 
J., concurring) (stating that “courts traditionally found infringement of intellectual 
property rights to be irreparable” since “damages are difficult to measure”);  
Douglas Dynamics, LLC v. Buyers Prods. Co., 717 F.3d 1336, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 
(holding that “[i]rreparable injury encompasses different types of losses that are often 
difficult to quantify”). See generally McGowan, supra note 122, at 578 (“Irreparable harm 
is that which cannot be compensated adequately with money damages.”). 
143 Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 877 F. Supp. 2d 838, 904 n.9 (N.D. Cal. 2012) 
(holding that “the incalculability of future lost market share supports a finding that 
monetary damages are an inadequate remedy”); Metso Minerals, Inc. v. Powerscreen 
Int’l Distrib. Ltd., 788 F. Supp. 2d 71, 74–75 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing cases showing that 
“when a plaintiff can show that infringement caused a loss of value in its business that is 
difficult to quantify—such as market share, goodwill, or reputation—then the plaintiff is 
more likely to have been irreparably injured”); see also Robert Bosch, 659 F.3d at 1155 
(“Bosch argues that it will continue to suffer irreparable harm due to lost market share, 
lost business opportunities, and price erosion unless Pylon is permanently enjoined. 
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tion in the price of patented technology,144 or injury to a patentee’s 
name recognition or reputation.145 Courts have also found that in-
fringement activities which undermine a patentee’s entire business 
model constitute the kind of irreparable harm that would justify an 
injunction.146 In all of these categories of harm, it could be extraor-
dinarily challenging to reduce damages to a single monetary figure. 
As such, courts may determine that ex ante injunctive relief is more 
appropriate than a knotty ex post calculation of damages.147 
eBay warned against using a “categorical rule” that the licens-
ing of patents precluded the grant of an injunction against the in-
fringement of those patents. Indeed, injunctive relief remains avail-
                                                                                                                            
According to Bosch, money damages alone cannot fully compensate Bosch for these 
harms. We agree.”). 
144 Robert Bosch, 659 F.3d at 1155. 
145 Douglas Dynamics, 717 F.3d at 1344 (stating that “[i]rreparable injury encompasses 
different types of losses that are often difficult to quantify, including . . . erosion in 
reputation and brand distinction”); AstraZeneca LP v. Apotex, Inc., 633 F.3d 1042, 1063 
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (noting that harm to goodwill can be unquantifiable and, as such, 
constitute irreparable injury). See generally McGowan, supra note 122, at 578 (asserting 
that “[p]aradigm cases” of irreparable harm include “harm to reputation”). 
146 Harris Corp. v. Fed. Express Corp., No. 6:07-cv-1819-Orl-28KRS, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 96257, at *38 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 28, 2011) (finding irreparable harm by 
distinguishing plaintiff’s calculated licensing activities from an entity that “routinely 
grants boilerplate licenses”); ReedHycalog UK, Ltd. v. Diamond Innovations, Inc., No. 
6:08-CV-325, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83011, at *38 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 12, 2010) (noting that 
a failure to grant injunction would cause irreparable harm to plaintiff’s business model of 
granting licenses in only a specific business segment); Judkins v. HT Window Fashions 
Corp., 704 F. Supp. 2d 470, 477 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (granting an injunction because there 
would cause irreparable harm to plaintiff’s existing licensing relationships); Joyal Prods. 
v. Johnson Elec. North Am., Inc., No. 04-5172 (JAP), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15531, at 
*29 (D.N.J. Feb. 27, 2009) (finding that an injunction was necessary to prevent 
irreparable harm to planned asset sale). 
147 In principle, courts are not inexperienced in the calculation of economic losses such 
as lost market share, so it can be difficult to understand why such injuries should be seen 
as “irreparable.” See, e.g., Douglas Ellis et al., The Economic Implications (and 
Uncertainties) of Obtaining Permanent Injunctive Relief After eBay v. MercExchange, 17 
FED. CIR. B.J. 437, 445 (2008) (questioning why courts have categorized “typical business 
losses” as irreparable harm); McGowan, supra note 122, at 588 (suggesting reasons why 
competitive harm may be seen as “irreparable”). See generally Steven D. Porter, Jr., Post-
eBay Economic Standards for Assessing Irreparable Harm, 94 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
SOC’Y 250 (2012) (suggesting standards for determining when infringement harms may 
be quantified and, as such, injunctions should not issue). A few courts have indeed held 
that damages from lost sales can be quantified and, as such, should not be deemed 
irreparable harm. See, e.g., IGT v. Bally Gaming Int’l. Inc., 675 F. Supp. 2d 487, 492 (D. 
Del. 2009) (finding that damages from lost sale and lost profits can be quantified). 
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able for many patentees under eBay—even for patentees that li-
cense their patents.148 eBay, however, did significantly impact a 
particular category of licensing patentee: firms that indiscriminate-
ly grant access to their patented technology. Some patentees show 
a readiness to provide their technology to all willing licensees, and 
this undermines courts’ enthusiasm for enjoining specific third-
party infringers. The next two sections consider two very different 
licensing models in which patentees provide broad, indiscriminate 
access to their technology, and show how eBay has acted in each 
case to limit the availability of injunctive relief. 
B. Patent “Trolls” 
Patent “trolls” are rarely able to satisfy the eBay standard.149 
The classic patent troll does not practice the patented technolo-
gy.150 Rather, the primary business model of a troll is to purchase 
                                                                                                                            
148 See Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp., 551 F.3d 1323, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“While the 
fact that a patentee has previously chosen to license the patent may indicate that a 
reasonable royalty does compensate for an infringement, that is but one factor for the 
district court to consider. The fact of the grant of previous licenses, the identity of the 
past licensees, the experience in the market since the licenses were granted, and the 
identity of the new infringer all may affect the district court’s discretionary decision 
concerning whether a reasonable royalty from an infringer constitutes damages adequate 
to compensate for the infringement.”). As such, research institutions that license their 
patents have been able to receive injunctions on the theory that the infringement caused 
irreparable harm to the institution’s academic competitiveness. See, e.g., Commonwealth 
Sci. & Indus. Res. Org. v. Buffalo Tech. Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 600, 604–05 (E.D. Tex. 
2007); see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING 
PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 229 (2011) (“A patentee that 
licenses as part of a technology transfer program, such as a university or semiconductor 
design house, can suffer harm from infringement that is more akin to that suffered by a 
manufacturing patentee.”); Chien & Lemley, supra note 2, at 10 (finding that district 
courts have granted injunctions to 100% of universities and research institution 
patentees). 
149 Chien & Lemley, supra note 2, at 10 (showing that after eBay district courts only 
infrequently grant injunctions to non-practicing entities); see John M. Golden, Patent 
Trolls and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2111, 2113 (2007); Benjamin H. Diessel, Note, 
Trolling for Trolls: The Pitfalls of the Emerging Market Competition Requirement for 
Permanent Injunctions in Patent Cases Post-eBay, 106 MICH. L. REV. 305, 318 (2007) 
(reviewing post-eBay case law to find that courts denied injunctions to patentees that 
“sought to market their patent indirectly, by licensing them in exchange for royalties”). 
150 While acknowledging the difficulty in precisely defining the term “troll,” this 
Article uses that terminology as a useful shorthand for referring to certain patent 
activities. See, e.g., Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 6, at 2009 (“Defining a patent troll has 
proven a tricky business, but that does not mean the problem does not exist.”). The 
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patents and then assert those purchased rights against firms that 
produce the patented goods or services.151 Trolls are generally not 
selective about the firms to which they grant patent licenses. In-
deed, from the perspective of the classic troll, every additional li-
censee contributes to the success of the business model by produc-
ing additional licensing revenue.152 Justice Kennedy, concurring in 
eBay, pointedly distinguished such entities from other patent hold-
ers engaged in “producing and selling goods.”153 Trolls, he as-
serted, often employ injunctions as a “bargaining tool to charge 
exorbitant fees.”154 Courts, he admonished, should take heed of 
such differences when deciding whether to grant injunctions 
against infringement.155 
Scholars fiercely disagreed over the extent of the patent troll 
“problem,”156 and whether trolls should be entitled to injunctive 
relief. Some commentators defended the eBay decision against 
“rent-seeking” trolls.157 Other scholars focused on the challenges 
posed by trolls in specific circumstances, such as when trolls 
brought suits against multi-component products that included both 
infringing and non-infringing parts.158 In these situations, patent-
                                                                                                                            
“troll” epithet reflects popular disdain of the troll’s business model. Other more neutral 
labels for such entities include “patent assertion entities” and “non-practicing entities.” 
See In re Packard, 751 F.3d 1307, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
supra note 148, 220 n.21 (using the term “patent assertion entity . . . to refer to firms 
whose business model primarily focuses on purchasing and asserting patents”). 
151 Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 COLUM. 
L. REV. 2217, 2118, 2141–42 (2013). 
152 See, e.g., Ricoh Co. v. Quanta Comput., Inc., No. 06-cv-462-bbc, 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 38220, at *5–6 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 19, 2010) (noting that plaintiff non-practicing 
entity had issued licenses to all other industry participants). 
153 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2008) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
154 Id. 
155 Id. at 397. 
156 See, e.g., Lemley & Melamed, supra note 151, at 2129 (asking whether “[t]rolls are 
really the problem?”). 
157 Robert P. Merges, The Trouble with Trolls: Innovation, Rent-Seeking, and Patent Law 
Reform, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1583, 1610 (2009). 
158 Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 6, at 2009 (“Our analysis strongly supports the 
conclusion that holdup is of particular concern when the patent itself covers only a small 
piece of the product, as is common in the industries in which so-called patent trolls 
predominate.”); see also DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW 
COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 139 (2009). 
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owning trolls would “hold-up” innovative firms in order to extract 
money that was not “a legitimate part of the value of a patent,” but 
rather reflected “the inability of the accused infringer to separate 
the infringing component from the noninfringing ones after the 
fact.”159 On the other hand, some commentators criticized how 
courts “discriminated” against trolls by refusing to enjoin the in-
fringement of their patents.160 According to this view, the denial of 
injunctive relief for certain patent holders would “discourage inno-
vation, patenting, or patent ownership.”161 
Regardless of these theoretical disputes, cases in the wake of 
eBay substantially limited the availability of injunctive relief for pa-
tent trolls.162 Considering such entities do not actually produce 
goods or services, they have difficulty showing that infringement of 
their rights results in the irreparable harm that eBay demanded for 
the granting of injunctions.163 Trolls cannot demonstrate that con-
tinued infringement will cause the loss of customers or market 
share that they do not seek, or will erode the prices of products that 
they do not manufacture.164 In other words, patent trolls have diffi-
culty demonstrating their need to “exclude” infringers from mar-
kets that they are in any event not commercializing. Moreover, 
since patent trolls indiscriminately license their patents for money, 
they cannot argue that monetary damages would not adequately 
                                                                                                                            
159 Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 6, at 2009–10; see also Chien & Lemley, supra note 2, 
at 6 (noting the harms caused by trolls in specific scenarios, such as with multicomponent 
products, interoperability standards, or where infringement suits reduce competition); 
Vincenzo Denicolo et al., Revisiting Injunctive Relief: Interpreting eBay in High-Tech 
Industries with Non-Practicing Patent Holders, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 571, 590–91 
(2008) (asserting that holdup problems occur only in specific circumstances, and that the 
assumption of “inadvertent infringement” of patented technology “is crucial to the 
holdup result”). 
160 Golden, supra note 149, at 2160. 
161 Id. at 2156. 
162 See sources cited supra note 149. 
163 See, e.g., Cardsoft, Inc. v. Verifone Holdings, Inc., No. 2:08-CV-98-RSP, 2013 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 155256, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2013) (Patentee could not show irreparable 
harm since it “long ago stopped developing its own software products.”); Laserdynamics, 
Inc. v. Quanta Comput., Inc., No. 2:06-CV-348-TJW, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61645, at *7 
(E.D. Tex. June 22, 2010) (Plaintiff patentee never used the infringed patent “to develop 
a product. There has been no loss of market share, lost profits, and potential revenue to 
LaserDynamics, and there will likely be none in the future. Further, there is no concern of 
loss of brand name recognition and goodwill.”). 
164 Laserdynamics, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61645, at *7. 
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compensate them for the infringement of their rights.165 Even more 
so—a troll’s regular licensing transactions provide courts with an 
easy way of quantifying what level of royalties could provide satis-
factory compensation for infringement. 
C. FRAND Commitments 
eBay has also limited the availability of injunctions for FRAND-
committed patents. At base, a patentee that makes a FRAND 
commitment promises to provide third parties with access to its 
protected technology at reasonable terms. If the actions of a patent 
troll demonstrate an inclination to make technology available in 
exchange for compensation, a FRAND commitment puts such rea-
diness down in writing.166 This Section reviews the place and signi-
ficance of FRAND promises, and traces the developing jurispru-
dence that limits the remedies available for patents encumbered by 
such commitments.167 
                                                                                                                            
165 Xpertuniverse, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., No. 09-157-RGA, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164935, 
at *46 (D. Del. Nov. 20, 2013) (“[M]oney damages are rarely inadequate for a 
patentholder that is willing to forego its exclusive right for some manner of 
compensation.”); Laserdynamics, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61645, at *8 (Patentee’s 
“extensive licensing history . . . demonstrates that money damages have been and will 
continue to be sufficient to remedy any infringement.”); Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. 
Rambus Inc., 609 F. Supp. 2d 951, 986 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (“This historical practice [of 
licensing its patents] suggests that Rambus is primarily concerned with monetary 
compensation for use of its patented technology . . . .”); see also Ted Sichelman, Purging 
Patent Law of “Private Law” Remedies, 92 TEX. L. REV. 517, 521 (2014) (noting that 
“because an NPE would by definition license its patents, a liability rule providing 
damages on a forward-looking basis . . . would return the NPE exactly to that state of the 
world that would have existed but for the infringement”). 
166 See also Lemley & Melamed, supra note 151, at 2141 & n.108 (noting that both patent 
trolls and FRAND-committed have difficulty showing that infringement results in 
irreparable harm). 
167 Unlike the federal courts, the standard for obtaining an injunction-like “exclusion 
order” from the International Trade Commission (“ITC”) is not linked to the eBay 
standard. See Spansion, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 629 F.3d 1331, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(“Given the different statutory underpinnings . . . this court holds that eBay does not 
apply to Commission remedy determinations.”). As such, a FRAND-committed patentee 
may have greater chance to obtain an injunction-like remedy at the ITC than at the federal 
courts. See Kesan & Hayes, supra note 20, at 311. In contrast, the Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC”) has investigated entities for seeking injunctions on FRAND-
encumbered patents, and such entities have entered into consent orders with the FTC, 
limiting their ability to seek such injunctions. See, e.g., Elyse Dorsey & Matthew R. 
McGuire, How the  Google Consent Order Alters the Process and Outcomes 
of FRAND Bargaining, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 979, 979 (2013). The standards used by 
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FRAND commitments arise most prominently in the context of 
the standard-setting process. Technical standards allow devices in 
our connected world to interoperate. For example, the 802.11 stan-
dards form the basis for Wi-Fi networking by describing how de-
vices can connect wirelessly.168 Adoption of the common standard 
allows manufacturers to be sure that their devices can communi-
cate wirelessly with other products and platforms. Such standards 
provide value to society by facilitating interoperability as well as 
encouraging innovation and competition on the shared platform.169 
Proprietary technology incorporated in a standard can be a val-
uable asset, given that implementation of a popular standard will 
also, by design, require the broad adoption of the included technol-
ogy. Patent rights covering the technology in a standard are often 
described as “standard essential patents” (“SEPs”), because use 
of the patented technology is essential for implementation of the 
standard. Participants in the standard-setting process are typically 
required by standards organizations to commit to license their 
SEPs on FRAND terms.170 FRAND commitments encourage 
adoption of the standard by providing assurance that any technolo-
gy in the standard—even the technology protected by proprietary 
rights—will be available for licensing on reasonable terms. At the 
same time, the FRAND structure also allows patent holders to se-
cure “fair and reasonable” compensation for their investments in 
innovative technology.171 The FRAND pledge, however, provides 
                                                                                                                            
administrative agencies such as the ITC and FTC in examining the propriety of seeking 
injunction-like remedies for FRAND-encumbered patents are beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
168 Recent litigation between Microsoft and Motorola involved the 802.11 standards. See 
infra text accompanying notes 188–90. 
169 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, POLICY 
STATEMENT ON REMEDIES FOR STANDARDS-ESSENTIAL PATENTS SUBJECT TO 
VOLUNTARY F/RAND COMMITMENTS 3–4 (2013), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/ 
guidelines/290994.pdf [https://perma.cc/CG8B-69ZH] (“Interoperability standards 
have paved the way for moving many important innovations into the marketplace, 
including the complex communications networks and sophisticated mobile computing 
devices that are hallmarks of the modern age.”); Lemley, supra note 77, at 1896 
(discussing benefits of standards). 
170 See generally Lemley, supra note 77, at 1906. 
171 See, e.g., Damien Geradin, The Meaning of “Fair and Reasonable” in the Context of 
Third-Party Determination of FRAND Terms, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 919, 922 (2014); 
Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 90, at 1137. 
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only a vague commitment to allow access at undetermined rates, 
and market participants are typically left to themselves to hammer 
out the details.172 Disputes can arise when firms cannot find agree 
on what constitutes FRAND licensing terms. 
Scholars have long tried to excavate more precise meaning out 
of the amorphous FRAND commitment, including trying to under-
stand whether a FRAND-committed patentee can seek an injunc-
tion if the parties cannot agree on appropriate licensing terms. 
Some commentators have asserted that FRAND commitments 
should preclude the issuance of an injunction. According to this 
position, the availability of injunctions would allow patentees to 
“hold-up” device manufacturers—in other words, to demand ex-
orbitant fees for the use of patented technology after manufacturers 
have already made significant investments in incorporating the 
standardized technology. 173 Other scholars have defended the 
availability of injunctive relief for FRAND-encumbered patents by 
pointing to the typically indeterminate language of FRAND com-
mitments, which frequently do not include express prohibitions on 
seeking injunctions.174 Opponents of restricting injunctions for 
FRAND-committed patents also argue that such limitations raise 
the possibility of “reverse hold-up”—where the user of patented 
technology feels comfortable demanding unreasonably low royalty 
                                                                                                                            
172 Most standard-setting organizations disclaim any role in determining the details of a 
FRAND license. See Lemley, supra note 77, at 1906; see also Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 
90, at 1137 (stating that litigation over FRAND royalties demonstrates the “ambiguities 
and omissions in the FRAND system”). 
173 See, e.g., Joseph Farrell et al., Standard-Setting, Patents, and Hold-Up, 74 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 603, 638 (2007) (“Our interpretation implies that a patent holder that has made a 
commitment to license on a FRAND basis should not be able to get (or threaten) an 
injunction against use of the technology to comply with the standard.”); Lemley, supra 
note 77, at 1967 (Patentees committing to FRAND obligations “generally are agreeing to 
give up their right to injunctive relief and extraordinary damages.”); Joseph Scott Miller, 
Standard Setting, Patents, and Access Lock-In: RAND Licensing and the Theory of the 
Firm, 40 IND. L. REV. 351, 358 (2007) (The “core meaning of the RAND promise” is “an 
irrevocable waiver of injunctive relief and other extraordinary remedies.”). 
174 See, e.g., Damien Geradin & Miguel Rato, Can Standard-Setting Lead to Exploitative 
Abuse? A Dissonant View on Patent Hold-Up, Royalty Stacking and the Meaning of FRAND, 
3 EUR. COMPETITION J. 101, 118–19 (2007); Joshua D. Wright, SSOs, FRAND, and 
Antitrust: Lessons from the Economics of Incomplete Contracts, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 791, 
806 (2014) (“No maxim of contract interpretation requires” that FRAND commitments 
be understood to prohibit injunctive relief.). 
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rates because courts will not back up the patentee with an injunc-
tion.175 
Notwithstanding these academic disagreements, a developing 
jurisprudence sees FRAND commitments as incompatible with the 
availability of injunctive relief. The first judicial pronouncements 
on this issue came in the case of Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc.176 The 
dispute between the two companies began in October 2010, with 
Motorola filing a complaint against Apple with the International 
Trade Commission, alleging infringement of six patents.177 The 
dispute descended into a series of claims and counterclaims, with 
Motorola eventually asserting that Apple infringed a patent for al-
locating channels in a wireless communications system. Motorola 
had previously asserted that this specific patent was essential for 
implementing cellular systems, and had pledged to license the pa-
tent on FRAND terms.178 Notwithstanding this FRAND commit-
ment, however, Motorola sought to enjoin Apple’s use of the pa-
tented cellular technology. 
The district court, with Judge Poser sitting by designation, held 
that Motorola’s claim for injunctive relief was inconsistent with its 
FRAND commitment: “By committing to license its patents on 
FRAND terms, Motorola committed to license the 898 [patent] to 
anyone willing to pay a FRAND royalty and thus implicitly ac-
knowledged that a royalty is adequate compensation for a license to 
use that patent.”179 Moreover, Judge Posner held that Motorola 
would not be able to obtain injunctive relief even if Apple (as Mo-
torola had asserted) was not willing to negotiate a license agree-
                                                                                                                            
175 Wright, supra note 174, at 807 (“[W]eakening the availability of injunctive relief for 
infringement . . . may increase the probability of reverse holdup and weaken any 
incentives implementers have to engage in good faith negotiations with the patent 
holder.”). 
176 869 F. Supp. 2d 901 (N.D. Ill. 2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. 
Cir. 2014). 
177 See Florian Mueller, Apple vs. Motorola: Now 42 Patents-in-Suit (24 Apple and 18 
Motorola Patents), FOSS PATENTS (Dec. 3, 2010), http://www.fosspatents.com/2010/12/
apple-vs-motorola-now-42-patents-in.html [https://perma.cc/B72R-HAWH] (recapping 
the early history of the disputes). 
178 Apple, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 911–12. Specifically, Motorola has stated that the patent 
was essential for implementing the Universal Mobile Telecommunications Standard 
(“UMTS”). Id. 
179 Id. at 914. 
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ment in good faith: “Motorola agreed to license its standards-
essential patents on FRAND terms as a quid pro quo for their being 
declared essential to the standard. . . . It does not claim to have 
conditioned agreement on prospective licensees’ making counte-
roffers in license negotiations.”180 Judge Posner’s decision was 
grounded in an understanding of the economic effect of the 
FRAND license commitment. According to the court (approvingly 
quoting a Federal Trade Commission policy statement), manufac-
turers are essentially “locked-in to practicing the standard.”181 
Providing injunctive relief on FRAND patents that cover the stan-
dard would allow patentees to leverage the manufacturer’s “high 
switching costs” in order to obtain “unreasonable licensing 
terms.”182 
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision not to 
grant injunctive relief, though with different reasoning. According 
to the Federal Circuit, there should be no “separate rule or analyti-
cal framework for addressing injunctions for FRAND-committed 
patents.”183 Rather, the determination of whether to grant an in-
junction was always to be measured under the eBay standard. Un-
der eBay, the court held, FRAND patentees could have difficulty 
establishing that infringement caused irreparable harm: Motorola’s 
many license agreements for the infringed FRAND patent showed 
that “money damages are adequate to fully compensate Motorola 
for any infringement.”184 Moreover, Motorola had licensed the pa-
tent to a large number of industry participants, and could not pro-
vide evidence that adding one additional user (i.e., Apple) would 
cause Motorola irreparable harm.185 In fact, according to the court, 
“Motorola has agreed to add as many market participants as are 
willing to pay a FRAND royalty,”186 thus showing that a monetary 
FRAND royalty would indeed compensate Motorola for Apple’s 
use of the patent technology. As such, the court affirmed that the 




183 Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2014), overruled on other 
grounds by Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
184 Id. at 1332. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. 
42                FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVII:1 
 
FRAND commitment precluded Motorola from obtaining injunc-
tive relief in these circumstances.187 
The concurrent case of Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc.188 pro-
vides additional clarity concerning the unlikeliness of obtaining an 
injunction for the infringement of FRAND-encumbered patents.189 
Microsoft’s Windows 7 operating system incorporated H.264 
technology, a widely used standard for video compression.190 Mo-
torola owned certain patents that it had previously declared were 
essential to the implementation of the H.264 standard, and Moto-
rola had declared that it would license these patents “to an unre-
stricted number of applicants on a worldwide, non-discriminatory 
basis and on reasonable terms and conditions.”191 Microsoft sued 
Motorola for allegedly breaching this commitment to license the 
patent under FRAND terms, and Motorola’s counterclaims in-
cluded a request for an injunction against the Windows 7 operating 
system for infringement of the patents.192 
The district court reviewed Motorola’s claims for an injunction 
under eBay. The court concluded that Motorola could not demon-
strate the irreparable harm required by eBay to obtain an injunc-
tion.193 By making the FRAND commitment, Motorola was obli-
gated to license the patents under FRAND terms to “any and all 
implementers of the H.264”194 standard. The court stood ready to 
determine the appropriate FRAND royalty and, according to Mo-
torola’s own statements, that court-determined royalty would pro-
vide Motorola with an adequate remedy for Microsoft’s use of the 
patented technology. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit agreed that 
claims for injunctions for FRAND-committed patents should be 
evaluated under eBay—a FRAND commitment would not auto-
matically exclude the granting of injunctive relief, but FRAND-
                                                                                                                            
187 Id. 
188 No. C10-1823JLR, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170587 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 29, 2012), 
aff’d, 795 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2015). 
189 The case uses the RAND (rather than FRAND) terminology, but this Article refers 
to Motorola’s FRAND commitments for purposes of internal consistency. 
190 Microsoft, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170587, at *18–19. 
191 Id. at *15. 
192 Id. at *17–19. 
193 Id. at *26. 
194 Id. at *28 n.9. 
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committed patentees would find it difficult to show that infringe-
ment caused the requisite irreparable harm.195 
In short, courts have turned to the eBay analysis in determining 
the availability of injunctions for patent trolls and FRAND-
encumbered patents. In both situations, patentees have difficulty 
satisfying eBay’s demands that injunctions will only issue upon a 
showing of irreparable harm. Both categories of patent owners have 
provided almost indiscriminate access to their proprietary rights in 
exchange for monetary compensation and, as such, find it challeng-
ing to demonstrate how the continued infringement of one addi-
tional defendant will bring irreparable ruin upon them. The follow-
ing Part examines the applicability of eBay to royalty-free commit-
ments and questions whether eBay provides a coherent framework 
for analysis in that context. 
III. THE REMEDIES PUZZLE 
Patentees that make royalty-free commitments do not intend to 
relinquish all of their rights under the patent. First, the scope of 
royalty-free commitments is typically limited to certain specifica-
tions, granting no rights outside of that scope.196 In addition, royal-
ty-free commitments are ordinarily flanked by non-monetary con-
ditions, such as the hanging sword of defensive termination or a 
requirement to provide the shield of a reciprocal license.197 Infring-
ers that do not satisfy these demands should not be eligible for a 
license under the literal terms of the royalty-free licensing com-
mitment. What remedies are open to a patentee that wishes to en-
force these requirements? 
The question of remedies presents the central puzzle of the 
royalty-free commitment: The patentee has waived its right to ex-
clude third parties, but has waived that right only in exchange for 
non-monetary obligations that can be exceedingly difficult to value. 
On the one hand, by making that indiscriminate license commit-
                                                                                                                            
195 Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1046 (9th Cir. 2015). The Ninth 
Circuit expressly stated that it agreed with the decision of the Federal Circuit in Apple v. 
Motorola. Id. at 1048 n.19. 
196 See supra text accompany notes 95–98. 
197 See supra text accompanying notes 99–102. 
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ment, the patentee demonstrates that it is not interested in using 
the patent to exclude competitors, making it difficult to show that 
any particular unauthorized use of the patented technology would 
result in the irreparable harm that is a doctrinal perquisite for 
granting injunctive relief. On the other hand, the patentee seeks 
consideration that may be impossible for courts to quantify in terms 
of a money amount, and the loss of which may not be feasible to 
remedy except through the grant of injunctive relief. 
Both sides of this doctrinal coin come up in the cases following 
eBay. In those cases, the doctrines worked together to provide pro-
ductive guidance in assessing whether patentees should be entitled 
to injunctive relief in a wide range of situations. Patentees that 
granted indiscriminate rights generally did so for monetary com-
pensation, demonstrating both that the patent holder was not using 
the patent to exclude competitors, and that it could be compen-
sated with money damages. The zero-rate commitment, however, 
presents a situation where these doctrines diverge in two contradic-
tory directions. In other words, once a patentee has provided a 
royalty-free public licensing commitment, the eBay line of cases 
advances strong arguments why that patentee should not be en-
titled to an injunction to protect against infringement, but at the 
same time also shows why injunctive relief may be essential to 
guarding the interests of the patentee. This Part follows both sets 
of tracks, demonstrating how the two paths lead to conflicting con-
clusions. 
A. Against Injunctions 
Under eBay, courts have hesitated to grant injunctions to firms 
with a business model of indiscriminately licensing their patents. 
By making their technology available to infringers, these patentees 
show courts that the financial rewards of the licensing program 
provide adequate compensation for the infringement of the patents. 
Specifically, the operations of patent trolls and the content of the 
FRAND commitments provide strong evidence that a monetary 
royalty provides the patentee with adequate compensation, and 
that a court-issued injunction is not necessary. Moreover, the troll-
owned or FRAND-committed patent may already be in use by a 
not inconsiderable number of firms, each paying a negotiated royal-
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ty. Under such circumstances, where the patented technology is 
already in broad use, it will be difficult for a patentee to show in 
court that the use of the patent by an additional firm would cause 
the irreparable injury necessary for obtaining injunctive relief.198 
These doctrinal considerations apply equally to a patentee that 
has provided a royalty-free commitment. By making that commit-
ment, the patentee shows that it is not interested in brandishing the 
patent to exclude competitors from the market.199 Instead, the 
commitment evidences a clear policy of licensing the patents on an 
indiscriminate basis, even to the extent of making that policy evi-
dent under the uniform terms of an open source license or other 
standardized patent licensing agreement. As such, under eBay, the 
zero-rate patentee has renounced its right to “exclude,” and 
should be no more entitled to an injunction than a patent troll or a 
FRAND-committed patentee. Of course, the infringer may not be 
hewing to the literal terms of the license commitment—either by 
using the patented technology outside of the licensed scope or 
without providing the required reciprocal rights—but under eBay 
and its progeny a patentee will be hard pressed to show that such 
                                                                                                                            
198 See supra text accompanying note 186–87. 
199 Many courts following eBay have held that a plaintiff patentee’s licensing activity 
shows that it is not using the patent to “exclude” competitors and, conversely, that a 
refusal to license demonstrates that the patent is being used to “exclude.” See, e.g., 
Douglas Dynamics, LLC v. Buyers Prods. Co., 717 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 
(Patentee “had never licensed the infringed patents, and intentionally chose not to, so 
that it could maintain market exclusivity.”); FenF, LLC v. SmartThingz, Inc., No. 12-cv-
14770, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51009, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 14, 2014), rev’d on other 
grounds, FenF, LLC v. SmartThingz, Inc., 601 Fed. Appx. 950 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Patentee 
“made a business decision to try and retain market exclusivity for products covered by 
the . . . patent and thus to not license its use” and infringement diminished patentee’s 
“ability to exclude others from practicing its patent despite its decision to retain market 
exclusivity.”); Arlington Indus. v. Bridgeport Fittings, Inc., No. 3:06-CV-1105, 2011 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 77592, at *30 (M.D. Pa. July 18, 2011) (finding the showing of irreparable 
harm was bolstered because plaintiff “strategically declin[ed] to license the patent on its 
quick-connect device and, instead, exploit[ed] its monopoly to exclude potential rivals”); 
Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, Inc. v. CIBA Vision Corp., 712 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1289 
(M.D. Fla. 2010) (Patentee was “willing to share [the patent rights] . . . with so many of 
its competitors,” which was inconsistent with its “assertion that only enforcement of its 
right to exclude . . . will redress the harm” suffered from infringement.); see also High 
Tech Med. Instrumentation, Inc. v. New Image Indus., 49 F.3d 1551, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 
1995) (holding that licensing is “incompatible with the emphasis on the right 
to exclude that is the basis for the presumption” of irreparable harm from infringement). 
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non-compliance causes “irreparable injury.” Certainly, the paten-
tee cannot show that it has lost sales of, or been forced to accept 
lower prices for, technology that is in any event provided at no 
charge.200 It will be similarly challenging to demonstrate that the 
patentee’s reputation is irreparably harmed by the unauthorized 
use of otherwise free and broadly available technology.201 Moreo-
ver, though the infringer may breach its obligations of reciprocity 
by bringing an infringement suit against the patentee, courts have 
been clear that the (easily measurable) costs of defending such suits 
would not constitute irreparable injury.202 In sum, as the Federal 
Circuit pronounced with regard to FRAND-encumbered patents, it 
is difficult to see how “adding one more user”203 of royalty-free 
and widely used technology could result in irreparable injury to the 
patentee. 
Commentators have noted the problems of “holdup” that 
could occur were courts to grant injunctive relief for the infringe-
ment of troll-owned or standard essential patents.204 In these situa-
tions, the patentee may be able to extort firms into paying royalties 
in excess of the value of the patented technology.205 Such concerns 
are equally present in the context of the royalty-free commitment. 
While a patentee making a royalty-free commitment cannot extract 
holdup value in the form of monetary payment—the zero-rate 
royalty precluding financial reward—it could extort non-monetary 
compensation such as far-reaching reciprocal licensing commit-
                                                                                                                            
200 See cases cited supra note 143 (holding that lost sales and price erosion can constitute 
irreparable harm); see also Cordance Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 333, 341 
(D. Del. 2010) (Plaintiff granted broad royalty-free licenses “in order to create an open 
[I]nternet standard necessary for widespread adoption” but the “decision to grant a free 
license to anyone willing to use its technology supports this court’s refusal to grant 
injunctive relief in defense of . . . [patentee’s] exclusive right to use such technology.”). 
201 See cases cited supra note 145 (holding that damage to reputation can constitute 
irreparable harm). 
202 See ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 694 F.3d 1312, 1337 
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (holding that litigation costs “are not an irreparable harm in 
the injunction calculus”); Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2012 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170587, at *28 n.9 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 30, 2012), aff’d, 795 F.3d 1024 
(9th Cir. 2015) (stating that “easily measurable litigation costs to enforce one’s rights 
cannot constitute irreparable harm”). 
203 Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
204 See supra text accompanying notes 158–59, 173. 
205 Id. 
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ments.206 Indeed, the question of whether a reciprocal commitment 
is unreasonable could be devilishly hard to answer, as it may re-
quire the examination, valuation, and comparison of both the intel-
lectual property rights granted by the patentee and the rights with-
held by the infringer.207 
Given the difficulty of establishing irreparable harm and the po-
tential for holdup, court-awarded monetary relief could constitute a 
more sensible remedy for the infringement of zero-rate encum-
bered patents. Indeed, courts are well-experienced in using a broad 
range of factors to calculate the compensation due to a patentee 
injured by infringement.208 While the patentee has chosen in cer-
tain circumstances to provide the patent under royalty-free terms, 
this does not mean that courts must impose this zero-rate valuation 
in all situations so as to preclude the patentee from receiving ap-
propriate compensation.209 Courts can employ standard techniques 
to calculate suitable monetary damages, even when infringers 
refuse to abide by the non-financial aspects of a license. 
                                                                                                                            
206 Commentators and regulatory bodies have in other contexts specifically pointed to 
the problem of overly expansive reciprocal commitments. See sources cited and 
discussion supra note 101; see also ANTITRUST/IP GUIDELINES, supra note 99, § 5.6 
(noting possible antitrust concerns with “grantback” licensing provisions). 
207 See Kuhn et al., supra note 101, at 4 (arguing that the determination of whether 
“complex package of cross-licenses satisfies F/RAND is difficult for a third party”). 
208 In calculating the “reasonable royalties” payable by an infringer, courts will weigh a 
list of fifteen factors, referred to as the Georgia-Pacific factors after the case in which they 
were first enumerated. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 
1119–20 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified and aff’d, 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971). The Federal 
Circuit has endorsed the use of the Georgia-Pacific factors in calculating reasonable 
royalties. See, e.g., LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Comput., Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 60 n.2 
(Fed. Cir. 2012). 
209 The Federal Circuit has cautioned that, when using previously negotiated license 
agreements to infer a reasonable royalty, a patentee must show that these license 
agreements are “comparable.” See, e.g., Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 
1301, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Patentee “had the burden to prove that the licenses were 
sufficiently comparable to support the lump-sum damages award.”). Indeed, in 
determining whether a license agreement is comparable for purposes of calculating a 
FRAND royalty, the Federal Circuit has held that expert testimony must speak to all 
“distinguishing facts,” including any “cross-licensing terms.” See, e.g., Ericsson, Inc. v. 
D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1227 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
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B. For Injunctions 
Under eBay, courts have granted injunctions when damages to 
the patentee from ongoing infringement become difficult to val-
ue.210 For instance, courts provide injunctive relief when the paten-
tee demonstrates that infringement will result in the loss of market 
share or customers or a reduction in the price of proprietary tech-
nology.211 Courts and commentators have similarly focused on the 
difficulty in measuring the harm that ongoing infringement can 
cause to a patentee’s reputation.212 In all of these situations, the 
problems of quantifying damages to the patentee in monetary terms 
have pushed courts toward providing injunctive relief. 
In the same sense, the non-monetary obligations that surround 
the royalty-free commitment often serve to protect important 
commercial and community interests, and translating the loss of 
these protections into a cash damage award could prove challeng-
ing. A central motivation for making a royalty-free commitment 
may be to encourage the sale of interoperable devices.213 Allowing 
infringers to use the patent beyond the limited scope of interopera-
bility could sandbag the impetus for providing the commitment in 
the first place. Moreover, the limited scope of the commitment, by 
strictly confining the situations in which the patent is provided 
royalty-free, can be instrumental in encouraging patentees to par-
ticipate in a royalty-free standard or in open source develop-
ment.214 As such, a failure to police the boundaries between the au-
thorized and unauthorized scope of the royalty-free commitment 
                                                                                                                            
210 See sources cited supra note 142. Courts after eBay have frequently emphasized how 
the difficulty of calculating monetary damages weighs in favor of providing injunctive 
relief. See, e.g., i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 862 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(“The loss associated with these effects is particularly difficult to quantify. Difficulty in 
estimating monetary damages is evidence that remedies at law are inadequate.”); Versata 
Software, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., No. 2:07-CV-153 CE, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102267 , at 
*11 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2011) (“[T]he inability to calculate Versata’s future loss with 
reasonable precision makes legal remedies inadequate in this case.”); MGM Well Servs., 
Inc. v. Mega Lift Sys., LLC, 505 F. Supp. 2d 359, 379 (S.D. Tex. 2007) (“Monetary 
damages are not adequate to compensate MGM for the continued loss of the exclusive 
rights under the [patent]. Future damages cannot be readily calculated at this point.”). 
211 See cases cited supra note 143. 
212 See sources cited supra note 145. 
213 See supra text accompanying notes 88–93. 
214 See supra text accompanying notes 106–08. 
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could undercut the main business strategies driving such commit-
ments. Courts would be hard-pressed to value the harms caused by 
such infringement with the core business models of the patentee.215 
Other non-monetary obligations, such as reciprocal and defen-
sive provisions, aim to discourage infringement claims and ensure 
patentees’ freedom to develop their products.216 Courts may be 
able to put a price tag on the specific costs of litigation to defend 
against the claims of an infringer that flouts these provisions.217 But 
the costs of infringement suits go beyond the simple costs of litiga-
tion, and courts may find it “exceedingly difficult” to put a price 
on the drag to a patentee’s business caused by aggressively asserted 
claims of infringement.218 Moreover, such non-monetary provi-
sions may aim to encourage fence-sitting patentees to join the col-
laborative effort.219 Failure to enforce these commitments through 
injunctive relief could undermine the collaborative undertaking as a 
whole, and the resulting damage could be extraordinarily difficult 
to value. How could courts put a price on the damages caused to a 
collaborative effort by patentees who, seeing how joining the colla-
boration would cripple their ability to enforce their property rights, 
decide not to join in promoting the standard at all? 
Moreover, compensating spurned patentees with monetary 
payments, rather than an injunction, ignores the objectives of the 
patentee in making the royalty-free commitment in the first place. 
In the same way that a patentee making a FRAND commitment 
“strongly suggest[s] that money damages are adequate to fully 
compensate”220 it for relinquishing the right to exclude, a patentee 
making a royalty-free commitment signals that it is not at all inter-
                                                                                                                            
215 See cases cited supra note 146 (showing that courts grant injunctive relief where 
infringement undermines the business model of the patentee). 
216 See supra text accompanying notes 99–102. 
217 See supra text accompanying note 202. 
218 See Jaffe v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 737 F.3d 14, 30–31 (4th Cir. 2013) (discussing the 
difficulty in quantifying the monetary exposure from the termination of cross licenses in 
the semiconductor industry); Rev. Proc. 2007-23, 2007-10 I.R.B. 675, 677 (Taxpayers are 
not required to take into account any income under royalty-free cross-licensing 
relationships, since “while valuation of intellectual property is always difficult, valuation 
of patent rights is exceedingly difficult where the parties enter into the cross licensing 
arrangement to avoid or settle patent infringement disputes.”). 
219 See supra text accompanying notes 109–11. 
220 Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
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ested in pursuing such monetary compensation. Instead, the royal-
ty-free commitment suggests that the patentee is intensely inter-
ested in other non-financial remuneration, such as reciprocal li-
censing commitments, to the extent that it is willing to completely 
renounce the receipt of any financial compensation in order to at-
tain these non-monetary obligations. 
At base, the royalty-free commitment is meant to advance a 
particular business or community strategy. That chosen strategy 
could be relying on a collaborative development process, the sale of 
interoperable devices, or assurances for a firm’s freedom of opera-
tion. A patentee may have opted for non-financial licensing terms 
over monetary license payments specifically to satisfy the needs of 
the chosen business or community model. Courts that refuse to 
enforce the non-monetary terms preferred by the patentee risk 
substituting the patentee’s chosen model with its own ideas of how 
the patent rights should be exploited. 
In sum, the royalty-free licensing commitment stresses the fault 
lines of post-eBay patent remedies jurisprudence. Royalty-free 
commitments are made by patentees motivated to disseminate 
their technology to the extent that they are willing to give it away 
for free—not the ordinary background of a patentee protesting the 
irreparable injury of infringement. On the other hand, the non-
monetary nature of the consideration that such patentees do pur-
sue may be impossible to quantify in monetary terms. The follow-
ing Part, looking for the origins of this fracture, considers how 
courts in other patent licensing contexts have analyzed the ques-
tions presented by non-monetary consideration. 
IV. NON-MONETARY CONSIDERATION 
Conflicts between different doctrinal possibilities can have 
deep roots. The difficulty of resolving the contradiction of the 
royalty-free commitment—whether the infringement of the zero-
rate committed patent may be remedied through an injunction—
grows out of courts’ inadequate attention to non-monetary consid-
eration in licensing transactions, and how such non-monetary obli-
gations have been used to structure the licensing relationship and 
broader industry arrangements. As shown, market participants of-
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ten insert non-monetary obligations into licensing transactions in 
order to frame and focus the relationship of the parties. However, 
in performing the “irreparable harm” analysis and in determining 
whether to grant injunctive relief, courts have generally ignored the 
significance attributed by the parties themselves to these non-
financial aspects of the transaction. 
eBay itself reflects this myopic view. eBay recognized that cer-
tain patentees employ patents to “exclude,” while other patentees 
“prefer to license their patents.”221 Moreover, the Court recog-
nized that the goals of a licensor may be varied and, as such, the 
preference of one business model—exclusion or licensing—over 
the other does not necessarily decide the question of whether the 
patentee is entitled to an injunction.222 Nonetheless, despite this 
appreciation for the diverse pursuits of technology owners, the 
Court centered its attention on the licensing of patents for mone-
tary gain. The only “unconventional” licensing models discussed 
by the Court were “university researchers or self-made inven-
tors,”223 whom the Court recognized “might reasonably prefer to 
license their patents, rather than undertake the efforts to secure the 
financing necessary to bring their works to market themselves.”224 
Even these relatively uncommon licensing models, however, are 
also directed toward the receipt of monetary consideration. By the 
time eBay was decided in 2006, non-monetary licensing models 
such as open source or royalty-free cross-licenses (discussed in 
greater detail below) were already well established. Even so, these 
non-financial licensing frameworks were left out of the eBay analy-
sis. 
The two concurring opinions in eBay, even as they emphasize 
one business model or another, again take no notice of licensing 
models directed toward non-financial compensation. The concur-
ring opinion of Chief Justice Roberts emphasizes how patents are 
                                                                                                                            
221 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392–93 (2006). 
222 See id. (criticizing the district court for using a “categorical rule” that a “plaintiff’s 
willingness to license its patents” and “its lack of commercial activity in practicing the 
patents” would be sufficient to establish that the patent holder would not suffer 
irreparable harm if an injunction did not issue). 
223 Id. 
224 Id. 
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used as a “right to exclude,”225 and may therefore be enforced with 
an injunction. The concurring opinion of Justice Kennedy empha-
sizes how non-practicing entities use patents “primarily for obtain-
ing licensing fees,”226 and may therefore not suffer the irreparable 
harm necessary to grant an injunction. Neither concurrence, how-
ever, discusses how some patentees neither “exclude” nor seek 
“licensing fees,” but rather license their patents in exchange for 
more intangible consideration. eBay leaves such non-monetary li-
censing structures outside of the irreparable harm analysis. 
Court decisions following eBay have continued to reflect this 
disregard for the role played by non-monetary obligations. For ex-
ample, in both Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc.227 and Broadcom 
Corp. v. Emulex Corp.,228 Broadcom sought injunctions against a 
competitor for patent infringement. Broadcom, a fabless semicon-
ductor company, had previously entered into a series of cross-
licensing agreements with competitors.229 Such arrangements are 
common in the semiconductor industry, in which companies fre-
quently possess large patent portfolios that they wield for defen-
sive, rather than offensive, purposes.230 These firms often hoard 
their patents as bargaining chips, held to be traded in broad cross-
                                                                                                                            
225 Id. at 395. 
226 Id. at 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
227 No. SACV 05-467 JVS (RNBx), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97647, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 
31, 2007). 
228 Nos. SACV 09-1058 JVS (ANx), SACV 10-3963 JVS (ANx), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
129524, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2012). 
229 Emulex, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129524, at *13 & n.9 (noting that Broadcom had 
licensed the infringed patent to Intel and Agere as part of broad cross-licensing 
transactions); Qualcomm, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97647, at *12 (“Broadcom has used 
licensing as a tool to settle pending or threatened litigation, but has generally done so 
through portfolio-wide cross-licenses. It has not licensed key technology on a patent-by-
patent basis.”). 
230 Peter C. Grindley & David J. Teece, Managing Intellectual Capital: Licensing 
and Cross-Licensing in Semiconductors and Electronics, 39 CAL. MGMT. REV. 8, 9 (1997) 
(discussing cross-licensing practices in the semiconductor industry); Bronwyn H. Hall & 
Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox Revisited: An Empirical Study of Patenting in 
the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 1979-1995, 32 RAND J. ECON. 101, 104 (2001) (positing 
that the patent strategy of semiconductor firms is mainly “aimed at reducing concerns 
about being held up by external patent owners and at negotiating access to external 
technologies on more favorable terms”); see also Jaffe v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 737 F.3d 14, 
19 (4th Cir. 2013) (describing the practice of cross-licensing in the semiconductor 
industry). 
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licensing deals with other semiconductor companies or to be 
swapped in litigation settlements.231 Such cross-licensing arrange-
ments often set royalties at zero, or nominal rates, and frequently 
contain the kind of reciprocal or defensive terminations provisions 
that also appear in royalty-free licensing commitments.232 In other 
words, the cross-licensing of patents in the semiconductor industry 
is frequently directed toward the pursuit of non-monetary goals, 
rather than toward the collection of licensing fees.233 
Both defendants in the Broadcom cases tried to argue that, un-
der eBay, Broadcom’s prior cross-licensing arrangements undercut 
Broadcom’s motions for an injunction. Specifically, the defendants 
asserted that Broadcom’s willingness to cross-license its patents 
(as per common practice in the semiconductor industry) showed 
that Broadcom was not averse to licensing its intellectual property 
and, as such, Broadcom could not show that continued infringe-
ment would result in the irreparable harm necessary to obtain an 
injunction.234 The courts disagreed, holding that the licensing of 
intellectual property in the context of a broad cross-licensing ar-
rangement could not show that Broadcom was in general also will-
ing to license its patents for monetary consideration.235 The Broad-
                                                                                                                            
231 Hall & Ziedonis, supra note 230, at 107. 
232 See Grindley & Teece, supra note 230, at 18 (discussing the valuation of patents in 
cross-licensing relationships, and noting that the net payment will be “small or zero” 
where “both firms contribute similar portfolio values”); Carl Shapiro, Navigating the 
Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POL’Y 
& ECON. 119, 130 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2001) (noting that cross licenses often 
“involve no running royalties, although they may involve balancing payments at the 
outset to reflect differences in the strength of the two companies’ patent portfolios”); id. 
at 133 (describing the practices of large semiconductor firms in requiring “grantbacks” in 
cross licenses). 
233 See Grindley & Teece, supra note 230, at 16 (discussing the non-monetary goals of 
patent cross-licensing in the semiconductor industry); see also Gideon Parchomovsky & 
R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 26 (2005) (discussing defensive 
patenting strategies in the semiconductor industry). 
234 Indeed, in Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., Broadcom offered such cross licenses 
to Qualcomm as well. See No. SACV 05-467 JVS (RNBx), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97647, 
at *18 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2007). 
235 Broadcom Corp. v. Emulex Corp., Nos. SACV 09-1058 JVS (ANx), SACV 10-3963 
JVS (ANx), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129524, at *13 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2012) (The court 
held that previous Broadcom cross-licenses did not preclude the grant of an injunction 
because, “[w]hile the willingness to license a competitor may be significant, the context 
of litigation, in which Broadcom granted and receive[d] protection for intellectual 
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com decisions reflect the sometimes understanding of the courts 
that trading patents for non-financial consideration does not neces-
sarily reflect a willingness to trade them for money.236 
At the same time, however, the Broadcom courts did not discuss 
the flip side of the coin: Would the court’s refusal to grant an in-
junction against the infringing firm undercut the cross-licensing 
model common in the semiconductor industry? In other words, 
does the attractiveness of the cross-licensing model to semiconduc-
tor firms depend to some extent on the premise that patentees may 
obtain an injunction to enforce their patents, such that the denial of 
the injunction would erode both the licensor’s readiness to grant a 
broad cross-license as well as the licensee’s call to receive one?237 
Neither of the parties in a royalty-free cross-license relationship is 
pursuing monetary compensation. To the extent that the non-
monetary structure of the cross-licensing model rests on a court’s 
                                                                                                                            
property [through a cross license], substantially diminishes the point.”); Qualcomm, 2007 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97647, at *18 (“A willingness to [license] a competitor as part of a 
broad cross-license arrangement where resolution of litigation is a major incentive is not 
the same as the willingness to grant a competitor . . . a license which will only serve to 
improve unilaterally the competitor’s position.”). 
236 Compare ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., No. 3:09cv620, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
54957, at *46 (E.D. Va. May 23, 2011) (stating that agreements that contained cross 
licenses or a covenant not to sue could not be used in a “reasonable, reliable way” in 
order “to arrive at an ongoing royalty”), with Advanced Cardiovascular Sys. v. Medtronic 
Vascular, Inc., 579 F. Supp. 2d 554, 561 (D. Del. 2008) (“The fact that ACS was selective 
regarding its licensing compensation—exchanging its technology only for other licenses 
to competing technology—does not rectify the fact that ACS was willing, ultimately, to 
forego its exclusive rights for some manner of compensation.”). Compare Apple, Inc. v. 
Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 11-CV-01846-LHK, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29721, at *112 (N.D. 
Cal. Mar. 6, 2014), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, vacated in part, 786 F.3d 983 (Fed. Cir. 
2015) (holding that the “special conditions” of the HTC agreement “provide little 
insight into whether Apple would be willing to provide Samsung unencumbered access to 
the patented features for money”), with Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 11-CV-
01846-LHK, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160337, at *47 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2013) (allowing the 
introduction into evidence of a “broad cross-license” agreement with HTC in order to 
show Apple’s willingness to license patents, but not to demonstrate the amount of 
reasonable compensation for infringement). 
237 See Ellis et al., supra note 147, at 459–63 (discussing that the reduced likelihood of 
injunctions after eBay limits the incentives to grant and take licenses); Hall & Ziedonis, 
supra note 230, at 109, 117 (noting how the propensity of the Federal Circuit to grant 
preliminary injunctions in patent infringement cases was one of the reasons that “patents 
had become far more important” to semiconductor firms “to use as bargaining chips in 
negotiations with other patent owner” in order to obtain a cross license). 
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willingness to protect the underlying patents with injunctive re-
lief—rather than through the grant of monetary compensation that 
interests no one—then the failure to grant such injunctions may 
result in irreparable harm to the parties’ business models, in the 
same way that the failure to enjoin against the infringement of pa-
tents that are used to exclude competitors results in irreparable 
harm to the business model of those patentees.238 Both patent 
strategies—exclusion of competitors and cross-licensing for non-
monetary rewards—pursue non-financial rewards as an initial mat-
ter, and as such both may depend on the ability to enforce patent 
rights through injunctions rather than monetary compensation in 
order to attain such non-financial goals. Perhaps a patentee would 
not make its own technology available through cross-license ar-
rangements if it could otherwise obtain such access through court-
sanctioned monetary compensation.239 Even so, while the Broadcom 
courts readily acknowledged how injunctions are essential to the 
first model of exclusion, they overlooked the possible importance 
of injunctions to the second licensing model. Following eBay, the 
courts did not have an analytical framework to assess the signific-
ance of injunctions in the context of non-monetary licensing mod-
els. 
Indeed, like the Broadcom decisions, other cases that have ex-
amined the effect of prior cross-licenses on the eBay analysis have 
uniformly considered only whether those prior licenses undercut a 
patentee’s right to an injunction.240 None of those cases have con-
sidered whether a patentee’s non-monetary cross-licensing strate-
                                                                                                                            
238 See supra text accompanying notes 210–15 (arguing that certain non-monetary 
licensing strategies may require courts to grant injunctive relief). 
239 Cf. Joshua S. Gans et al., When Does Start-Up Innovation Spur the Gale of Creative 
Destruction?, 33 RAND J. ECON. 571, 572 (2002) (providing a model indicating that 
stronger patent protection leads to more cooperation among firms, such as through 
licensing); Richard J. Gilbert & Willard K. Tom, Is Innovation King at the Antitrust 
Agencies? The Intellectual Property Guidelines Five Years Later, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 43, 66–
74 (2001) (detailing arguments by Intel that preventing the company from withholding its 
own intellectual property in patent disputes would “make it more difficult to reach pro-
competitive cross-licensing agreements”). 
240 See, e.g., Canon Inc. v. GCC Int’l Ltd., 450 F. Supp. 2d 243, 255 (S.D.N.Y 2006) 
(“This is not a case where plaintiff had freely licensed the product to others. The licenses 
that have been granted have been in the nature of cross-licenses and not for the 
manufacture and sale of products.”). 
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gy may actually weigh in favor of granting injunctions against in-
fringement. Courts have focused on the question of whether a li-
censing strategy that pursues monetary compensation undercuts the 
possibility of injunctive relief, and this focus has distracted from 
the possibility that licensing models which only pursue non-
monetary compensation may in contrast require injunctions in order 
to support the licensing model. 
This perspective has carried over to the FRAND context. Apple 
v. Motorola241 discussed how Motorola’s FRAND commitment to 
provide licenses to an indiscriminate number of firms showed that 
“money damages are adequate to fully compensate Motorola for 
any infringement.”242 At the same time, the court listed a number 
of situations in which Motorola could be entitled to an injunction 
notwithstanding the FRAND commitment—“where an infringer 
unilaterally refuses a FRAND royalty or unreasonably delays nego-
tiations to the same effect.”243 These two situations involve 
breaches of the monetary trade underlying the FRAND commit-
ment. The court, however, did not address the propriety of grant-
ing injunctions to enforce the non-monetary requirements standard 
to FRAND agreements, such as restrictions on the license scope, 
reciprocal licenses and defensive suspension provisions. Moreover, 
the court did not consider the possible harm that would result from 
providing access to FRAND-encumbered technology under court-
determined royalties without these accompanying non-monetary 
protections. These non-financial provisions are core to the 
FRAND bargain, protecting both the commercial interests of the 
patentee (by shielding its development of standard compliant de-
vices) and the shared interests of the standards community (by en-
couraging participation notwithstanding the broad licensing com-
mitments).244 Even so, the possible “irreparable harm” that could 
                                                                                                                            
241 Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
242 Id. 
243 Id. Judge Prost, writing separately, asserted that a FRAND-committed patentee 
should not be able to obtain injunctive relief if the infringer refuses to take a FRAND 
license. According to Judge Prost, injunctive relief should only issue where the patentee is 
unable to collect monetary damages. Id. at 1342–43 (Prost, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). Judge Prost’s discussion also overlooked the question of whether 
patentees should be able to obtain an injunction for the breach of non-monetary license 
terms. See id. 
244 See discussion supra Section I.E. 
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result from the failure to enforce the non-monetary aspects of the 
typical FRAND bargain was simply not part of the court’s calcu-
lus.245 
This is not to say, of course, that the incidence of non-
monetary aspects in a licensing model should always require courts 
to grant injunctive relief for infringement of the licensed patents. 
Each litigated licensing relationship is unhappy in its own way, and 
the importance of non-monetary provisions to a FRAND commit-
ment where the patentee may receive considerable financial com-
pensation differs substantially from the significance of those same 
provisions to a royalty-free commitment or a cross-licensing rela-
tionship where the patentee pursues no financial rewards at all. 
Moreover, the individual facts and circumstances of each specific 
case speak to the question of irreparable harm as well as to other 
facets of the eBay test.246 My point is only that courts have general-
ly ignored the importance of remedies (money damages vs. injunc-
tions) to the non-monetary aspects of licensing relationships. As a 
consequence, no appropriate analytical framework exists to be ap-
                                                                                                                            
245 A number of other courts have similarly focused on the possibility of receiving an 
injunction if an infringer does not comply with its monetary obligations under the 
FRAND bargain, but have overlooked the question of compliance with the non-monetary 
aspects of FRAND. See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1049 n.19 (9th 
Cir. 2015) (noting that “if an infringer refused to accept an offer on RAND terms, seeking 
injunctive relief could be consistent with the RAND agreement”); Realtek 
Semiconductor Corp. v. LSI Corp., 946 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1007 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (finding 
that an injunction against the infringer of RAND-encumbered patent “may be warranted 
where an accused infringer of a standard-essential patent outright refuses to accept a 
RAND license”); Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 913–14 (N.D. Ill. 
2012) (“I don’t see how, given FRAND, I would be justified in enjoining Apple from 
infringing the ‘898 [patent] unless Apple refuses to pay a royalty that meets the FRAND 
requirement.”). In the case of Microsoft v. Motorola, Motorola asserted that a FRAND 
patentee may seek injunctive relief against an infringer that contravened the kind of 
defensive termination clauses which are “common” in RAND relationships. See Letter 
Brief for Motorola at 3, Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 161762 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 12, 2013), ECF No. 851. The court did not 
directly address the question, holding that the jury reasonably found that Motorola’s 
overall course of conduct was a breach of its RAND commitment. Microsoft Corp. v. 
Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138786, at *35–36 (W.D. Wash. 
Sep. 24, 2013). 
246 The eBay test, of course, also requires an analysis of the balance of the hardships and 
the public interest. See supra text accompanying note 134. 
58                FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVII:1 
 
plied to licensing structures that, like the public royalty-free com-
mitment, involve no monetary compensation at all. 
The open source case of Jacobsen v. Katzer247 is one decision 
that did recognize the possible importance of injunctive relief for a 
non-monetary licensing model, albeit in the context of copyright, 
rather a than patent license. Jacobsen involved a hobbyist that had 
developed software for controlling model trains on their railroad 
tracks. This “Java Model Railroad Interface” (“JMRI”) was made 
available by the author at no charge under the Artistic License, an 
open source software license that generally provides users with 
broad rights to use, modify, and distribute the software without 
payment of any license fees.248 At the same time, the Artistic Li-
cense imposes certain minimal, non-monetary obligations on users, 
such as a requirement to provide certain copyright notices and no-
tices regarding modification, 249 and a requirement to make certain 
modifications publicly available.250 The defendant did not satisfy 
these non-financial requirements, and the Federal Circuit was 
called to determine whether defendant’s breach of its obligations 
raised a claim under copyright law. This determination, under 
then-current law, would significantly impact whether the plaintiff 
was entitled to injunctive relief.251 
The Federal Circuit found that the failure to satisfy the license 
conditions did indeed raise copyright claims, and that the plaintiff 
was therefore potentially entitled to an injunction. The decision 
mostly hinged on the interpretation of the specific language used in 
the license, rather than on substantive matters of copyright law. At 
                                                                                                                            
247 535 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
248 For the text of the Artistic License, see Artistic License 1.0, OPEN SOURCE 
INITIATIVE, http://opensource.org/licenses/artistic-license-1.0 [https://perma.cc/3LQ2-
PNWS] (last visited Oct. 11, 2016). 
249 Id. § 3. 
250 Id. § 4. 
251 When Jacobsen was first before the district court, applicable law required that a 
plaintiff who had demonstrated “probable success on the merits” was only required to 
show a “possibility” of irreparable injury in order to be entitled to injunctive relief. 
Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 367 (2008). The Supreme Court later 
decided that a plaintiff must show that it is “likely” to suffer irreparable harm. Id. This 
change in the law resulted in the district court eventually refusing to provide injunctive 
relief. See infra text accompanying note 255. 
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the same time, the court addressed at length the significance of the 
non-financial nature of the license obligations: 
Traditionally, copyright owners sold their copy-
righted material in exchange for money. The lack of 
money changing hands in open source licensing 
should not be presumed to mean that there is no 
economic consideration, however. There are sub-
stantial benefits, including economic benefits, to the 
creation and distribution of copyrighted works un-
der public licenses that range far beyond traditional 
license royalties. For example, program creators 
may generate market share for their programs by 
providing certain components free of charge. Simi-
larly, a programmer or company may increase its na-
tional or international reputation by incubating open 
source projects. Improvement to a product can 
come rapidly and free of charge from an expert not 
even known to the copyright holder.252 
In other words, according to the court, open source licensors 
receive value in exchange for their works even though the works 
are provided at no monetary cost to their users. This value can 
come in the form of the user’s purchase (for money) of comple-
mentary software and services provided by the licensor. Such value 
could also come in the form of more intangible consideration, such 
as an increase in reputation or a decrease in development costs, 
both a result of a greater number of users receiving, reviewing, and 
benefiting from the freely available software. 
The non-monetary notice requirements of the Artistic License, 
according to the court, were “vital”253 to ensuring that the open 
source licensor received such non-monetary value. The copyright 
notice required by the license provided users with information 
about the source of the JMRI project, allowing such users to join in 
the “collaborative effort”254 of the project. Additional notices re-
quired by the license delivered information about how the software 
                                                                                                                            
252 Jacobsen, 535 F.3d at 1379. 
253 Id. at 1381. 
254 Id. 
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was being used and improved, providing the licensor with impor-
tant market insights. 
The difficulty of valuing the non-financial value delivered by 
these obligations, continued the court, weighed in favor of granting 
injunctive relief for breach of the license: “Indeed, because a calcu-
lation of damages is inherently speculative, these types of license 
restrictions might well be rendered meaningless absent the ability 
to enforce through injunctive relief.”255 In other words, injunctions 
against continued infringement may be necessary to sustain the 
open source licensing model. The failure to provide such injunctive 
relief, and the provision of court-determined monetary compensa-
tion, would instead undermine the non-financial strategies of the 
open source licensor in seeking additional “creative collaborators,” 
recognition, or the promotion of other commercially licensed soft-
ware.256 Commentators have further excavated Jacobsen’s insight, 
showing the difficulty in having courts quantify in monetary terms 
the harm resulting from the failure to comply with non-financial 
requirements.257 Subsequent scholarship has expanded these ar-
guments by pointing to the social significance of the open source 
insistence on non-monetary rewards, and how substituting finan-
cial compensation for those non-monetary requirements funda-
mentally clashes with the communal values and goals of the open 
source licensor.258 
                                                                                                                            
255 Id. at 1382. 
256 Id. On remand, however, the district court found that plaintiff had not demonstrated 
a likelihood of irreparable harm and was not entitled to an injunction. According to the 
court, the plaintiff “failed to proffer any evidence of any specific and actual harm suffered 
as a result of the alleged copyright infringement and . . . failed to demonstrate that there is 
any continuing or ongoing conduct that indicates future harm is imminent.” Jacobsen v. 
Katzer, 609 F. Supp. 2d 925, 937 (N.D. Cal. 2009). Though the Federal Circuit in 
Jacobsen recognized the importance of injunctive relief to the royalty-free licensing model, 
the case may best be seen as demonstrating the difficulty of showing irreparable harm in 
circumstances where the rights holder has granted royalty-free licenses on an 
indiscriminate basis. 
257 See, e.g., David McGowan, The Tory Anarchism of F/OSS Licensing, 78 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 207, 218 (2011) (noting that the lesson of Jacobsen is that “most of the time it is 
costly and difficult for third parties to calculate the value of things that are not already 
priced by the parties themselves”). 
258 See, e.g., McGowan, supra note 122, at 593 (recognizing that failure to comply with 
the notice requirements of an open source license “is an insult,” and suggesting that such 
requirements “can be cashed out is to compound that insult by refusing to recognize their 
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The open source community lauded the Jacobsen decision.259 
But Jacobsen, in the field of copyright, stands in tension with pre-
viously discussed doctrinal strands in the field of patent law tug-
ging away from the availability of injunctive relief for non-monetary 
licensing commitments. In contrast to Jacobsen, cases addressing 
royalty-free cross-licenses have (like the Broadcom cases) failed to 
recognize the importance of injunctions to the non-monetary struc-
ture of that licensing model. FRAND decisions have concentrated 
on the difficulty of proving irreparable harm for licensing commit-
ments under rationales that would equally apply to royalty-free 
commitments. Even eBay itself overlooked non-financial patent li-
censing models and the significance of appropriate remedies for 
upholding those licensing strategies.260 
                                                                                                                            
own view [of the licensors] that their work is about something more than (or at least other 
than) money”); R. Michael Azzi, Note, CPR: How Jacobsen v. Katzer Resuscitated the 
Open Source Movement, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1271, 1299 (noting that injunctions are 
appropriate for enforcement of open source licenses since the underlying goal of open 
source developers is often “compliance, not money, for their distribution efforts, and a 
court should respect such value judgments on the part of the licensor”). Indeed, legal 
obligations of reciprocity in standard-setting organizations may also reflect the need for 
(non-financial) social norms of trust in the collaborative relationship. See generally Walter 
W. Powell, Neither Market nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization, 12 RES. ORG. 
BEHAV. 295, 304–05 (1990) (discussing the need for trust and reciprocity in network 
relationships). 
259 See, e.g., Brian Rowe, The “IP” Court Supports Enforceability of CC Licenses, 
CREATIVE COMMONS BLOG (Aug. 13, 2008), https://creativecommons.org/2008/08/13/ 
the-ip-court-supports-enforceability-of-cc-licenses [https://perma.cc/4M8Y-3MA2] 
(stating that Jacobsen “demonstrates a strong understanding of basic economic 
principles”); see also Lawrence Rosen, Bad Facts Make Good Law: The Jacobsen Case and 
Open Source, 1 INT’L FREE & OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE L. REV. 27, 28 (2009) (describing 
how in Jacobsen “various open source organizations cooperated to write an amicus brief 
that focused . . . on the critical issues” and how the “decision finally settled that open 
source licensors can enforce their licenses effectively”). 
260 A few district courts have paid lip service to the significance of non-monetary 
obligations in license agreements. Such statements have typically been made without 
analysis of the importance of such non-financial provisions, and have been ancillary to the 
consideration of other arguments that the courts considered more central to the question 
of whether injunctive relief should issue. See, e.g., Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, 
Inc., No. 04 C 5312, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86953, at *11 (N.D. Ill. May 22, 2008) 
(agreeing with plaintiff that injunction is justified since in addition to other factors 
monetary compensation would “not contain the myriad protections that a licensing 
agreement would normally possess”); Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc., v. 
GlobalSantaFe Corp., No. H-03-2910, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93408, at *19 (S.D. Tex. 
Dec. 27, 2006) (noting in a supplementary reason for providing an injunction that 
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CONCLUSION 
The doctrinal tangles of eBay lead to confusion for the royalty-
free licensing commitment. Ironically, however, the difficulty of 
subsuming the royalty-free commitment into the eBay test only 
confirms the suitability of the test for performing the jurispruden-
tial calculus of injunctive relief. eBay eschewed “broad classifica-
tions” or “categorical rule[s]”261 that hinder courts from examin-
ing the specific circumstances of the case, instead demanding that 
courts exercise their discretion in fashioning remedies appropriate 
to the facts before them.262 In this way, eBay provides a suitable 
framework for assessing unusual legal structures that, like the 
royalty-free licensing commitment, depart from more ordinary 
frameworks in their pursuit of atypical objectives. Indeed, Justice 
Kennedy, concurring in the eBay decision, noted that the broad la-
titude granted to courts in determining whether to grant an injunc-
tion “is well suited to allow courts to adapt to the rapid technologi-
cal and legal developments in the patent system.”263 The Federal 
Circuit, in tailoring the eBay test for the context of FRAND com-
mitments, similarly emphasized that the eBay test provides “ample 
strength and flexibility” in addressing the “unique aspects”264 
raised by those licensing frameworks. 
In contrast, other courts and commentators have championed 
stronger rules against the grant of injunctive relief for patents en-
cumbered by broad licensing commitments. The district court in 
Apple v. Motorola, for example, seemed to adopt a per se rule 
against injunctive relief when it stated that FRAND commitments 
“implicitly acknowledged that a royalty is adequate compensation 
for a license to use” the infringed patent.265 A range of academic 
                                                                                                                            
compensation in the form of monetary damages would not “contain any of the 
commercial business terms typically used by a patent holder to control its technology or 
limit encroachment on its market share”). 
261 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393 (2006). 
262 District courts have “considerable discretion” in “determining whether the facts of 
a situation require it to issue an injunction.” Id. at 394 (quoting Roche Prods. v. Bolar 
Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 865 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). 
263 Id. at 397. 
264 Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2014), overruled on other 
grounds by Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
265 Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 914 (N.D. Ill. 2012), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part, 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
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scholarship has also pressed for a broad rule against injunctions in 
the FRAND context.266 That bright line, however, disregards the 
non-monetary aspects and obligations common to both FRAND 
and royalty-free commitments, and would rule out injunctive relief 
even when a plaintiff may be able to show that the failure to satisfy 
such non-financial obligations had caused them irreparable harm. 
Should a FRAND-committed patentee, for example, be categori-
cally ineligible for injunctive relief even when the defendant in-
itiated patent litigation, a step that may have violated a defensive 
suspension provision? Should the rule against injunctions also ap-
ply when the defendant implemented the patented technology in 
technology that was not interoperable, or which fell outside the li-
censed specifications? A firm rule against injunctions would not 
admit a consideration of these issues, but the flexibility of the eBay 
rule could accommodate them in the context of both FRAND and 
royalty-free commitments. 
Consideration of non-monetary obligations also belies the adop-
tion of firmer rules against injunctions in standards organizations. 
Some scholars and regulatory bodies have pressed standards organ-
izations to make clear that patentees limit their right to pursue in-
junctive relief when they make licensing commitments.267 Such cla-
rification, proponents argue, would bring clarity to vague licensing 
commitments, and simplify the role of the courts in enforcing 
FRAND promises.268 Following these calls, the Institute of Elec-
trical and Electronics Engineers Standards Association (“IEEE-
SA”)  updated its own patent policy to restrict the availability of 
injunctive relief for FRAND-committed patentees. According to 
the updated IEEE-SA policy, patentees may not pursue injunctive 
relief for FRAND-encumbered patents unless and until they have 
participated in an adjudication (including an appellate review) to 
                                                                                                                            
266 See supra text accompanying note 173. 
267 See, e.g., Hesse, supra note 101, at 9 (suggesting that standards bodies could “[p]lace 
some limitations on the right of the patent holder who has made a F/RAND licensing 
commitment who seeks to exclude . . . through an injunction”); Kuhn et al., supra note 
101, at 1, 4–5 (arguing that a licensing “commitment should include a process that 
[patentees] must follow before they can seek an injunction or exclusion order”). 
268 Hesse, supra note 101, at 10 (arguing that “[s]tandards bodies whose members 
choose to take steps such as these will help the market for the standardized product to 
work efficiently by lowering costs, increasing transparency and reducing uncertainty—all 
of which benefit innovation and competition”). 
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determine the terms of a licensing arrangement and resolve other 
patent claims.269 This broad rule, however, does not distinguish 
between FRAND and royalty-free commitments, and would also 
preclude patentees from bringing suits for injunctive relief against 
infringers that violate non-monetary requirements—such as using 
encumbered technology outside the licensed scope or without pro-
viding reciprocal access to their own intellectual property. This 
Article has suggested that a less rigid rule may be appropriate for 
royalty-free commitments, or even with respect to the non-
monetary obligations in FRAND commitments. While the revised 
IEEE-SA rule may be appropriate for patentees that seek primarily 
monetary compensation, it could potentially undermine business 
models that do not pursue financial rewards as well as the objec-
tives of non-financial obligations embedded in more standard li-
censing arrangements. 
While this Article has concentrated on the royalty-free com-
mitment, such arrangements simply present a situation that, given 
the absence of all financial obligation, highlights the non-monetary 
aspects of the trade. A range of other intellectual property transac-
tions, from FRAND obligations to cross-licensing structures and 
ordinary licensing agreements, also include non-monetary condi-
                                                                                                                            
269 Section 6.2 of the IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws states that a FRAND-
committed patentee “agrees that it shall neither seek nor seek to enforce a Prohibitive 
Order [e.g., an injunction] . . . in a jurisdiction unless the implementer fails to participate 
in, or to comply with the outcome of, an adjudication, including an affirming first-level 
appellate review, if sought by any party within applicable deadlines, in that jurisdiction by 
one or more courts that have the authority to: determine Reasonable Rates and other 
reasonable terms and conditions; adjudicate patent validity, enforceability, essentiality, 
and infringement; award monetary damages; and resolve any defenses and 
counterclaims.” Policies and Procedures, IEEE STANDARDS ASS’N, http://standards. 
ieee.org/develop/policies/bylaws/sect6-7.html#6 [https://perma.cc/ZS6C-YA23] (last 
visited Oct. 11, 2016). The Department of Justice, in a business review letter that 
primarily focuses on patentees that seek monetary compensation, has stated that the 
revised IEEE-SA Patent Policy is unlikely to result in competitive harm. The letter states 
that the revised policy “will not be significantly more restrictive than current U.S. case 
law” and “does not affect the rights of patent holders . . . to seek patent damages, in the 
form of RAND compensation, for infringement of their patents when the parties cannot 
agree to a negotiated license.” See Letter from Renata B. Hesse, Acting Assistant Att’y 
Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice Antitrust Div.,  to Michael A. Lindsay, Dorsey & Whitney 
LLP 10 (Feb. 2, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2015/02/ 
02/311470.pdf [https://perma.cc/8NRZ-N6LJ]. 
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tions. While the financial figures of such arrangement may eclipse 
any attendant non-monetary conditions, those latter non-financial 
obligations also serve important functions in the transaction. 
Should courts issue injunctions when licensees fail to comply with 
such obligations? How should courts assess the importance of the 
non-monetary requirements to the broader goals of the patentee? 
The flexible eBay standard provides an accommodating vehicle for 
driving the analysis of these questions, so long as courts are willing 
to go beyond the standard exclusion/licensing divide. 
